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Although much has been written about the freedom of association and its 
ongoing importance to American constitutionalism, much recent scholarship 
mistakenly relies on a truncated history that begins with Roberts v. United 
States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984), the case that divided constitutional 
association into intimate and expressive components. Roberts’s doctrinal 
framework has been rightly criticized. However, neither the right of 
association nor all of its doctrinal problems start there. The Supreme Court’s 
foray into the constitutional right of association began a generation earlier 
with NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
This article offers a new look at the Court’s initial approach to the right of 
association. It highlights three factors that influenced the development of the 
right of association: (1) the conflation of rampant anti-communist sentiment 
with the rise of the Civil Rights Movement—a political factor; (2) infighting on 
the Court over the proper Constitutional grounding of the right of association 
and the relationship between association and assembly—a jurisprudential 
factor; and (3) the pluralist political theory of mid-twentieth century 
liberalism, which emphasized the importance of consensus, balance, and 
stability—a theoretical factor. It explores these factors, their relationship to 
one another, and the ways in which they influenced the right of association’s 
ambiguous constitutional anchor and ill-defined doctrinal framework. These 
early contours of the right of association paved the way for its reformulation 
in Roberts. If today’s freedom of association is inadequate, the roots of that 
inadequacy may lie in the political, jurisprudential, and theoretical factors 
that were present at its inception. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Although much has been written about the freedom of association and its 
ongoing importance to American constitutionalism, much recent scholarship 
mistakenly relies on a truncated history that begins with Roberts v. United 
States Jaycees,1 the 1984 case that divided the right of association into 
intimate and expressive components and introduced the constitutional 
paradigm that continues today. Roberts’s doctrinal framework has been rightly 
criticized.2 But neither the right of association nor its doctrinal problems began 
with Roberts, as the Court first recognized a constitutional right of association 
just over fifty years ago in its 1958 decision, NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. 
Patterson.3 
                                                                                                                 
 1. 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
 2. See, e.g., AVIAM SOIFER, LAW AND THE COMPANY WE KEEP 40–42 (1995) [hereinafter 
SOIFER, COMPANY]; George Kateb, The Value of Association, in FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 53, 
55 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1998); Nancy L. Rosenblum, Compelled Association: Public Standing, 
Self-Respect, and the Dynamic of Exclusion, in FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 75, 78–79 (Amy 
Gutmann ed., 1998). 
 3. 357 U.S. 449 (1958). Constitutional protections for group autonomy predate the 
constitutional right of association. See John D. Inazu, The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly, 84 
TUL. L. REV. 565, 606–11 (2010). For most of our nation’s history, the right of assembly has 
guarded against incursions by the state. Id. at 568. 
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This article offers a new look at the Court’s initial approach to the right of 
association in NAACP v. Alabama and the cases that followed. It highlights 
three factors that influenced the shaping of the right:  
(1) The historical coincidence of the Second Red Scare and the Civil Rights 
Movement (a political factor). From the late 1940s to the early 1960s, the 
government’s response to the communist threat pitted national security 
interests against expressive freedoms. These tensions arose in the South 
when segregationists analogized the unrest stirred by the NAACP to the 
threats posed by communist organizations; segregationists also charged that 
communists had infiltrated the NAACP itself. The Supreme Court responded 
unevenly, denying constitutional protections to communist organizations in 
the name of order and stability but protecting civil rights associations.  
 
(2) The Court’s disagreement as to the constitutional source of association (a 
jurisprudential factor). This disagreement was most evident when the Court 
sought to limit state (as opposed to federal) law. Justices Frankfurter and 
Harlan argued that the right of association constrained state action because it, 
like other rights, could be derived from the “liberty” of the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. I refer to this as the liberty argument. 
Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Douglas, and Brennan insisted that 
association could be located in some aspect of the First Amendment and 
urged that it be given the same “preferred position” as other First 
Amendment rights. In their view, association applied to the states because the 
Fourteenth Amendment had incorporated the provisions of the First 
Amendment. I call this the incorporation argument. At times, Black and 
Douglas also argued that the right of association was part of the right of 
assembly. I call this the assembly argument. Although the assembly 
argument received only minimal attention from the Court, it may have 
offered the least complicated path for grounding the right of association in 
the Constitution. Instead, the Justices’ disagreement over the liberty and 
incorporation arguments framed the legal discussion, in turn shaping the right 
of association.  
 
(3) The pluralism popularized by David Truman and Robert Dahl in the 
1950s and 1960s (a theoretical factor). Earlier pluralists advanced  
 
the conviction that government must recognize that it is not the sole 
possessor of sovereignty, and that private groups within the 
community are entitled to lead their own free lives and exercise 
within the area of their competence an authority so effective as to 
justify labeling it a sovereign authority.4  
 
By the mid-twentieth century, pluralism merged these insights with currents 
from Arthur Bentley’s “science of politics” and Louis Hartz’s “liberal 
                                                                                                                 
 4. Mark DeWolfe Howe, The Supreme Court, 1952 Term — Foreword: Political Theory 
and the Nature of Liberty, 67 HARV. L. REV. 91, 91 (1953) (describing “[t]he heart of the 
pluralistic thesis” advanced by “Gierke, Maitland, Figgis, [and] Laski”). 
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consensus.” The resulting political theory emphasized balance, stability, and 
consensus among groups rather than juxtaposing groups against the state. 
These assumptions laid the foundation for the freedom of association in two 
ways. First, they established a normative expectation that groups were 
valuable to democracy only to the extent that they reinforced and guaranteed 
democratic premises and, conversely, that groups antithetical to these 
premises were neither valuable to democracy nor worthy of its protections. 
Second, because this normative expectation excluded groups beyond the 
margins of consensus, pluralists saw the possibility of harmony and balance 
among groups that remained. Truman and Dahl supported these views by 
appealing to the two great theorists of association in the American context: 
James Madison and Alexis de Tocqueville. Truman and Dahl’s pluralist 
claims and their attendant interpretations of Madison and Tocqueville helped 
establish a theoretical background that qualified group autonomy with the 
interests of the democratic state.5  
These three factors—one political, one jurisprudential, and one theoretical—
contributed to the right of association’s ambiguous constitutional anchor and 
ill-defined doctrinal framework. Roberts certainly compounded these problems 
a generation later, and the Court’s subsequent development of the right of 
association has done nothing to remedy them.6 Nonetheless, some of the 
problems with the Court’s current approach to the right of association are 
linked to the factors that were present at its inception.  
This article explores the political, jurisprudential, and theoretical factors 
described above, their relationship to one another, and their lingering influence 
on today’s unsatisfactory framework for protecting group autonomy. Part II 
explores the communist threat that led to the imposition of associational 
restrictions during the 1940s and 1950s before the Supreme Court recognized a 
constitutional right to association. Part III focuses on the seminal case of 
NAACP v. Alabama. Part IV examines the right of association cases in the 
years immediately following NAACP v. Alabama and the Court’s continued 
struggle with surrounding political and jurisprudential factors. Parts V and VI 
turn to the pluralist political theory lurking in the background of some of these 
tensions and struggles. Finally, Part VII sketches some connections between 
the right of association that emerged out of this era and the right of association 
that exists today. 
                                                                                                                 
 5. This attenuated understanding of group autonomy continues in contemporary debates. 
See, e.g., ANDREW KOPPELMAN WITH TOBIAS BARRINGTON WOLFF, A RIGHT TO DISCRIMINATE?: 
HOW THE CASE OF BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA V. JAMES DALE WARPED THE LAW OF FREE 
ASSOCIATION 106 (2009) (“[T]here is an interest in ensuring that a major institution of civil 
society adapts to the cultural norms of the place where it operates.”). 
 6. See, e.g., Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
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II. THE POSTWAR POLITICAL CONTEXT AND THE COMMUNIST THREAT 
The constitutional right of association emerged out of a political context 
dominated by the growing paranoia over the threat of domestic communism in 
the late 1940s and early 1950s. The ubiquity of the communist scare across the 
branches of state and federal government compromised many of the 
safeguards of American civil liberties. This was not the first time that the 
American experiment faltered under such pressures, and as recent reactions to 
the threat of domestic terrorism attest, it would not be the last.7 But peculiar to 
the right of association’s emergence in the midst of the Second Red Scare—
perhaps in a way paralleled only by the Democratic–Republican Societies’ 
assertion of the right of assembly in the 1790s—was the claim by a group 
outside of the political mainstream to an untested constitutional right of group 
autonomy during a politically tumultuous time.8 
A. Executive and Legislative Measures 
The federal government had actively pursued the threat of domestic 
communism since formation of the House Committee on Un-American 
Activities (“HUAC”) in 1938.9 Concern over “subversive” government 
employees prompted the Hatch Act in 1939, the Civil Service Commission’s 
War Service Regulations in 1942, and formation of the Attorney General’s 
Interdepartmental Committee on Investigations in 1942.10 In 1947, the 
President’s Committee on Civil Rights reported that while “the government 
has the obligation to have in its employ only citizens of unquestioned loyalty, . 
                                                                                                                 
 7. A concise account of some of the more egregious episodes in our nation’s history is 
provided in Brief for Fred Korematsu as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 4–24, Rasul v. 
Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (Nos. 03-334, 03-343). Korematsu was the petitioner in Korematsu 
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
 8. See infra Part II.C. The Democratic-Republican Societies were some of the first 
groups to invoke the right of assembly in the years following the enactment of the Bill of Rights. 
See Robert M. Chesney, Democratic-Republican Societies, Subversion, and the Limits of 
Legitimate Political Dissent in the Early Republic, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1525, 1549–50 (2004). 
Chesney thoughtfully examines the struggle between the Democratic-Republican Societies and 
the federal government. See id. at 1536–72. For a discussion of the importance of the freedom of 
assembly to the Societies, see Inazu, supra note 3, at 577–81. 
 9. Christina E. Wells, Fear and Loathing in Constitutional Decision-Making, 2005 WIS. 
L. REV. 115, 124–25 (2005). Formed at the urging of Congressman Martin Dies of Texas, the 
investigative body was popularly known as the “Dies Committee” from 1938 to 1945. Id. From 
1945 to 1957, the HUAC conducted over 230 public hearings and examined over 3,000 
witnesses, 135 of whom were cited for contempt. CARL BECK, CONTEMPT OF CONGRESS: A 
STUDY OF THE PROSECUTIONS INITIATED BY THE COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES, 
1945–1957, at 181 (1959). 
 10. See Thomas I. Emerson & David M. Helfeld, Loyalty Among Government Employees, 
58 YALE L.J. 1, 14, 16–17 (1948) (discussing the development of federal government’s loyalty 
program). 
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. . our whole civil liberties history provides us with a clear warning against the 
possible misuse of loyalty checks to inhibit freedom of opinion and 
expression.”11 The Committee specifically cautioned of the dangers posed by 
“any standard which permits condemnation of persons or groups because of 
‘association.’”12  
That same year, President Truman established the Federal Employee 
Loyalty Program, allowing the federal government to deny employment to 
“disloyal” individuals.13 Over the next twelve months, the FBI examined over 
two million federal employees and conducted full investigations on over 6,300 
of them.14 The government’s loyalty determination considered “[a]ctivities and 
associations of an applicant or employee,” including “[m]embership in, 
affiliation with or sympathetic association with any foreign or domestic 
organization, association, movement, group or combination of persons, 
designated by the Attorney General as totalitarian, fascist, communist, or 
subversive.”15 Attorney General Tom Clark generated a list of 123 
“subversive” organizations.16 He testified before a HUAC subcommittee that 
the government intended to “isolate subversive movements in this country 
from effective interference in the body politic.”17 In a speech delivered shortly 
before his testimony, Clark declared that “[t]hose who do not believe in the 
ideology of the United States should not be allowed to stay in the United 
States.”18 
Constitutional scholars Thomas Emerson and David Helfeld attacked the 
loyalty program in a 1948 article in the Yale Law Journal, contending that the 
investigations encompassed “not only membership and activity in 
organizations, including labor unions, but private beliefs, reading habits, 
receipts of mail, associations, and personal affairs.”19 They charged that the 
program was “based upon the legal premise that Federal employees are 
                                                                                                                 
 11. PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS 49–50 (1947). 
 12. Id. at 50. 
 13. SAMUEL WALKER, IN DEFENSE OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES: A HISTORY OF THE ACLU 176 
(1990) (quoting Exec. Order No. 9835, 12 Fed. Reg. 1935, 1938 (Mar. 25, 1947)).  
 14. Emerson & Helfeld, supra note 10, at 32. By 1951, the FBI had conducted full-scale 
investigations of 14,000 federal employees, leading to the resignation of 2,000 of those 
employees. MELVIN I. UROFSKY, FELIX FRANKFURTER: JUDICIAL RESTRAINT AND INDIVIDUAL 
LIBERTIES 107 (1991). 
 15. Exec. Order No. 9835, 12 Fed. Reg. at 1938. 
 16. Emerson & Helfeld, supra note 10, at 32. The story of the Attorney General’s List of 
Subversive Organizations (“AGLOSO”) is chronicled in ROBERT JUSTIN GOLDSTEIN, AMERICAN 
BLACKLIST: THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S LIST OF SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATIONS (2008). By 1955, 
the list included almost 300 organizations. Id. at 62. The “AGLOSO designation was ‘usually a 
kiss of death to an organization.’” Id. (quoting ELLEN SCHRECKER, THE AGE OF MCCARTHYISM: 
A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS 47 (Bedford/St. Martin’s 2002) (1994)). 
 17. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 16, at 64. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Emerson & Helfeld, supra note 10, at 70. 
2010] THE STRANGE ORIGINS OF THE RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION 491 
 
entitled to no constitutional protection”20 and ignored “the right to freedom of 
political expression embodied in the First Amendment.”21 To Emerson and 
Helfeld, this “concept of the right to freedom in political expression” emerged 
from “the specific guarantees of freedom of speech, freedom of the press, the 
right of assembly[,] and the right to petition the government.”22 This right of 
political expression is “basic, in the deepest sense, for it underlies the whole 
theory of democracy.”23  
Although Emerson and Helfeld did not explicitly reference a “freedom of 
association,” they cited a speech delivered earlier in the year to the state bar of 
California by the powerful federal judge, Charles Wyzanski Jr.24 In his speech, 
Judge Wyzanski offered “[a]n inquiry [i]nto freedom of association,” 
suggesting that despite the “verbal kinship of the phrases freedom of speech, 
freedom of assembly[,] and freedom of association[,] . . . the triad represented 
an ascending order of complexity.”25 “The term ‘association’ implie[d] a body 
of persons who have assembled not on an ad hoc, but on a more or less 
permanent, basis and who are likely to seek to advance their common purposes 
not merely by debate but often in the long run by overt action.”26 The 
“freedom of association is peculiarly complicated” and “cuts underneath the 
visible law to the core of our political science and our philosophy.”27 
Wyzanski contended that by the time of Gunnar Myrdal’s 1944 book, An 
American Dilemma, “freedom of association was considered a deeply rooted 
characteristic of American society.”28 
But the “deeply rooted characteristic” was not evident in 1947. As the 
executive branch embarked on its loyalty investigations of government 
employees, the HUAC began to subpoena movie producers, screenwriters, and 
directors to examine alleged communist affiliations.29 In response, Hollywood 
personalities including Humphrey Bogart, Lauren Bacall, Groucho Marx, and 
                                                                                                                 
 20. Id. at 79. 
 21. Id. at 81. 
 22. Id. at 83. 
 23. Id. Emerson’s article drew a fiery response from J. Edgar Hoover, whose comments 
were printed in the next issue of the Yale Law Journal. See J. Edgar Hoover, Response, A 
Comment on the Article “Loyalty Among Government Employees,” 58 YALE L.J. 401 (1948). 
 24. Emerson & Helfeld, supra note 10, at 83 n.309 (citing Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., The 
Open Window and the Open Door: An Inquiry into Freedom of Association, 35 CAL. L. REV. 
336 (1947)). President Roosevelt appointed Judge Wyzanski to the federal bench in 1941. Eric 
Pace, Charles E. Wyzanski, 80, Is Dead; Judge on U.S. Court for 45 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 
1986, at A20. He served as a federal judge for 45 years, presided over the Harvard University 
Board of Overseers, and served as a trustee of the Ford Foundation. Id. Justice Felix Frankfurter 
mentored Judge Wyzanski at Harvard Law School and spoke of him as “one of the most brilliant 
students [he] ever had.” Id. 
 25. Wyzanski, supra note 24, at 336–37. 
 26. Id. at 337. 
 27. Id. at 337, 338. 
 28. Id. at 346 (citing GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 952 (1944)). 
 29. VICTOR S. NAVASKY, NAMING NAMES 79 (1980). 
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Frank Sinatra, formed the Committee for the First Amendment and flew to 
Washington, D.C. to support those called to testify.30 In October of 1947, ten 
Hollywood witnesses refused, on First Amendment grounds, to answer 
questions from the HUAC.31 But after Congress cited the “Hollywood Ten” for 
contempt, Hollywood largely abandoned its support.32 Within a month, top 
Hollywood executives agreed to blacklist them, and the Committee for the 
First Amendment “folded almost as fast as it had formed.”33  
One of the earliest attempts to challenge the HUAC inquiries based upon a 
“right of association” came after Dr. Edward Barsky refused to answer a 
records request by the HUAC.34 Barsky, a surgeon and national chairman of 
the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee, appealed his conviction to the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.35 The ACLU filed a brief on his 
behalf, arguing that the First Amendment prohibited “general inquiry into 
matters relating to opinion or affecting freedom of association.”36 Barsky lost 
at the court of appeals, and the Supreme Court declined to hear his case.37  
In their investigative hearings, the HUAC and the Senate Internal Security 
Subcommittee (“SISS”) routinely asked witnesses whether they were presently 
or had ever been a member of the Communist Party.38 The question posed a 
Catch-22. Witnesses who denied any affiliation could be charged with perjury 
based on contradictory circumstantial evidence.39 But those who admitted a 
communist affiliation usually suffered adverse economic and social 
                                                                                                                 
 30. Id. at 80. 
 31. Id. at 82. 
 32. Id. at 83. 
 33. Id. Hollywood executives issued the Waldorf-Astoria Policy Statement, which 
announced that producers would “not knowingly employ a Communist.” Movies Will Oust Ten 
Cited for Contempt of Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1947, at 1. The New York Times called 
the statement “an action unprecedented in American industrial fields.” Id. 
 34. See Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241, 243 (D.C. Cir. 1948). 
 35. Id.  
 36. WALKER, supra note 13, at 181. 
 37. Barsky, 167 F.2d 241, cert. denied, 334 U.S. 843 (1948). Following his six month 
prison sentence for contempt, Barsky returned to the Supreme Court to challenge New York’s 
suspension of his medical license; the Court took the case but concluded that New York’s 
suspension did not violate Barsky’s due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Barsky v. Bd. of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954). Justices Douglas, Black, and Frankfurter 
dissented. Justice Douglas expressed incredulity over the purported connection of Barsky’s 
refusal to comply with the HUAC and his ability to practice medicine. Id. at 472–74 (Douglas, 
J., dissenting). Justice Black argued that the Attorney General’s list of subversive groups 
amounted to a bill of attainder and that New York’s reliance on the list in suspending Barsky’s 
license violated his constitutional rights. Id. at 460–61 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Frankfurter 
alleged that the suspension violated due process by unreasonably depriving Barsky of his right 
to earn a living. Id. at 471 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See also LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE 
WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 80–82 (2000). 
 38. POWE, supra note 37, at 77. 
 39. Id.  
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consequences.40 As a result, a growing number of witnesses refused on 
constitutional grounds to answer questions. Initially, most of these witnesses 
invoked the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, but observers 
increasingly saw this as an admission of guilt by those they labeled “Fifth 
Amendment Communists.”41 Accordingly, witnesses began turning to the First 
Amendment. As with the Hollywood Ten, reliance on the First Amendment 
usually resulted in contempt of Congress citations.  
B. The Perceived Threat Grows 
Executive and legislative actions to curtail communist activity took on 
added urgency in light of global events including the Berlin blockade, the first 
Soviet test of an atomic bomb, and Mao Tse-tung’s overthrow of Chiang Kai-
Shek’s government in China.42 Fears of an ongoing domestic communist threat 
were also reinforced by Alger Hiss’s 1950 perjury conviction and the 
espionage convictions of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg the following year.43 As 
Lucas Powe has written: “Americans, very much including Supreme Court 
Justices, viewed these trials against the backdrop of communist expansion in 
Europe and Asia, and an aggressive anticommunism became a staple of 
American politics and society.”44 In light of the unsettling domestic and global 
developments, citizens across the political spectrum viewed the Smith Act 
prosecutions as a necessary defense against the spread of communism.45  
Sidney Hook captured the heightened fears and the growing tensions 
within liberalism in a popular 1950 article published in the New York Times 
Magazine titled Heresy, Yes—But Conspiracy, No.46 Hook warned that while 
“[t]he liberal stands ready to defend the honest heretic no matter what his 
views against any attempt to curb him,” “[t]he failure to recognize the 
distinction between heresy and conspiracy is fatal to a liberal civilization.”47 
                                                                                                                 
 40. Id. at 78. 
 41. Id. at 77–78. 
 42. In 1950, with these events in mind, Congress passed the McCarran Internal Security 
Act, Pub. L. No. 81-831, 64 Stat. 987 (repealed 1993), authorizing concentration camps for 
subversives, § 103–04, 64 Stat. at 1021–23, and requiring communists to register with the 
Subversive Activities Control Board, § 7–9, 64 Stat. at 993–96. Title one of the Act was also 
known as the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950. § 1(a), 64 Stat. at 987. Registered 
individuals were denied employment in government, defense and labor unions. § 5, 64 Stat. at 
992–93; see also POWE, supra note 37, at 77; WALKER, supra note 13, at 198. 
 43. POWE, supra note 37, at 15.  
 44. Id. 
 45. See id.  
 46. Sidney Hook, Heresy, Yes—But Conspiracy, No, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 9, 1950, at 
12. Hook’s similarly titled book, SIDNEY HOOK, HERESY, YES CONSPIRACY, NO (1953), became 
“one of the most prominent mid-century works reflecting seriously on questions relating to the 
freedom of association.” Ken I. Kersch, “Guilt By Association” and the Postwar Civil 
Libertarians, SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y, Summer 2008, at 53, 65.  
 47. Hook, supra note 46, at 12. 
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Hook drew a sharp distinction between “Communist ideas” and the 
“Communist movement.”48 “Communist ideas [we]re [merely] heresies, and 
liberals need have no fear of them where they are freely and openly 
expressed.”49 But the communist movement was “something much more than 
a heresy.”50 It included “native elements who by secrecy and stratagem serve 
the interests of a foreign power.”51 Hook saw the communist plot at work 
particularly in labor organizations and schools.52 In language that 
foreshadowed rhetoric of the Supreme Court, he maintained: “It is not his 
beliefs, right or wrong; it is not his heresies, which disqualify the Communist 
party teacher but his declaration of intention, as evidenced by official 
statements of his party, to practice educational fraud.”53 Policing the schools 
against communists was “a matter of ethical hygiene, not of politics or of 
persecution.”54  
C. The Supreme Court Speaks 
The Supreme Court joined the fracas of the communist scare in its 1950 
decision, American Communications Ass’n v. Douds.55 Douds involved a 
challenge to the Taft-Hartley amendments to the National Labor Relations Act 
(“NLRA”), which required that union officers submit affidavits disavowing 
membership in or support of the Communist Party before a union could 
receive the NLRA’s protections.56 The Court upheld the affidavit requirement, 
and Chief Justice Vinson’s majority opinion reasoned that the Act protected 
the country from “the so-called ‘political strike.’”57 Vinson referred to 
“[s]ubstantial amounts of evidence . . . presented to . . . Congress . . . that 
Communist leaders of labor unions had in the past and would continue in the 
future to subordinate legitimate trade union objectives to obstructive strikes 
when dictated by Party leaders, often in support of the policies of a foreign 
government.”58 Although recognizing that “[t]he high place in which the right 
to speak, think, and assemble as you will was held by the Framers of the Bill 
of Rights and is held today by those who value liberty both as a means and an 
end,” he concluded that the Act reflected “legitimate attempts to protect the 
                                                                                                                 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See id.  
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. Christopher Phelps suggests that Hook’s writing “became perhaps the most 
influential justification for firing Communists and suspected Communists from universities and 
schools in the early 1950s.” CHRISTOPHER PHELPS, YOUNG SIDNEY HOOK: MARXIST AND 
PRAGMATIST 227 (1997).  
 55. 339 U.S. 382 (1950). 
 56. Id. at 385–86. 
 57. Id. at 388. 
 58. Id. 
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public, not from the remote possible effects of noxious ideologies, but from 
present excesses of direct, active conduct.”59  
Just five years earlier, the Court had noted the “preferred place” of the 
freedom of assembly in Thomas v. Collins.60 In that case, Justice Rutledge 
concluded that “the great, the indispensable democratic freedoms secured by 
the First Amendment” meant that “[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering 
paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation.”61 Douds made 
no mention of Thomas’s preferred place doctrine but referred instead to “[t]he 
deference due to the legislative determination of the need for restriction upon 
particular forms of conduct.”62  
The Court’s weakening of associational protections continued in Dennis v. 
United States,63 a decision that ACLU national chairman Roger Baldwin later 
called “the worst single blow to civil liberties in all our history.”64 Dennis 
came to the Court after FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover initiated Smith Act 
prosecutions of twelve senior leaders of the Communist Party of the United 
States of America (“CPUSA”).65 The government charged the defendants with 
violating the Act’s membership clause, which made it unlawful  
to organize[] . . . any society, group, or assembly of persons who teach, 
advocate, or encourage the overthrow or destruction of any such government 
[in the United States] by force or violence; or becomes or is a member of, or 
affiliates with, any such society, group, or assembly of persons, knowing the 
purposes thereof.66 
In arguing its case, the government construed the Act so broadly that it “made 
no effort to prove that this attempted overthrow was in any sense imminent, or 
                                                                                                                 
 59. Id. at 399. 
 60. 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945); cf. United States v. Congress of Industrial Organizations, 
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 61. Thomas, 323 U.S. at 530. Justice Rutledge’s opinion also noted that the right of 
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small. Id. at 531. 
 62. Douds, 339 U.S. at 401. 
 63. 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
 64. WALKER, supra note 13, at 187; see also MARTIN H. REDISH, THE LOGIC OF 
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even in the concrete planning stages.”67 Following a nine month trial,68 the 
jury deliberated less than a day before convicting all twelve defendants.69  
Chief Justice Vinson’s plurality opinion in Dennis recounted the speech-
protective views of Justices Holmes and Brandeis70 and conceded that “there is 
little doubt that subsequent opinions have inclined toward the Holmes-
Brandeis rationale.”71 But Vinson completely refashioned Justice Holmes’s 
clear and present danger standard, concluding that with respect to the CPUSA, 
“[i]t is the existence of the conspiracy which creates the danger.”72 Milton 
Konvitz later quipped that Vinson’s interpretation of the Holmes-Brandeis 
rationale was “[d]octrine [r]educed to a [p]hrase.”73  
Justice Black’s dissent lamented: 
 Public opinion being what it now is, few will protest the conviction of 
these Communist petitioners. There is hope, however, that in calmer times, 
when present pressures, passions and fears subside, this or some later Court 
will restore the First Amendment liberties to the high preferred place where 
they belong in a free society.74  
Dennis generated little public outcry, and even liberals like Norman Thomas 
and Arthur Schlesinger supported the decision.75 One of the lone openly 
critical voices was Eleanor Roosevelt, who wrote the day after the decision: “I 
am not sure our forefathers—so careful to guard our rights of freedom of 
speech, freedom of thought and freedom of assembly—would not feel that the 
Supreme Court had perhaps a higher obligation.”76 Roosevelt spent the 
following two summers touring with Justice Douglas to criticize Dennis in 
public forums, an endeavor that at times met with hostility.77 
D. The Second Red Scare 
Dennis opened the floodgates for additional FBI investigations and 
prosecutions. The Justice Department began pursuing “second-string” CPUSA 
leadership and charged 126 communists with conspiracy under the Smith Act 
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 68. Id. at 82. 
 69. Id. at 87. 
 70. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 502–08 (1951). 
 71. Id. at 507. 
 72. Id. at 511.  
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 76. Id. at 154. 
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over the next few years.78 Paul Robeson, W.E.B. Du Bois, Lewis Mumford, 
Eleanor Roosevelt, and Henry Steele Commager launched sporadic efforts to 
halt the prosecutions or else obtain amnesty for the defendants.79 Albert 
Einstein also figured prominently in these efforts. When the SISS subpoenaed 
a high school English teacher named William Frauenglass to testify about 
possible communist affiliations in May of 1953, Frauenglass wrote Einstein 
requesting a letter of support.80 Einstein’s response, which appeared as part of 
a front page story in the New York Times, counseled that despite the inevitable 
consequences, “[e]very intellectual who is called before the committees ought 
to refuse to testify.”81  
Six months later, electrical engineer Al Shadowitz drove to Princeton to 
see Einstein after receiving a subpoena from the SISS.82 Shadowitz informed 
Einstein that he intended to rely on the First Amendment rights of speech and 
association rather than the Fifth Amendment in refusing to answer the 
Committee’s questions, a position that Einstein supported.83 At his public 
hearing, Shadowitz invoked the First Amendment and noted that “Professor 
Einstein advised me not to answer.”84 Despite the efforts of Einstein and 
others, widespread public concern for those accused never materialized, and 
the government routinely won even its weakest cases.85  
Anti-communist concerns also pervaded state legislation. In 1952, the 
Court considered Adler v. Board of Education,86 a speech and assembly 
challenge to a New York law that denied employment in its public schools to 
any person who advocated the violent overthrow of the government or who 
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joined a society or group of persons knowing that it advanced such advocacy.87 
The law took aim at “members of subversive groups, particularly of the 
Communist Party and its affiliated organizations [who] ha[d] been infiltrating 
into public employment in the public schools of the State.”88 Findings that “the 
members of such groups use[d] their positions to advocate and teach their 
doctrines . . . without regard to truth or free inquiry” in ways “sufficiently 
subtle to escape detection in the classroom” led the New York legislature to 
pass the restrictive statute.89 A 6–3 majority of the Court concluded that New 
York had acted “in the exercise of its police power to protect the schools from 
pollution and thereby to defend its own existence.”90  
Nine months after Adler, the Court finally acted to set limits on anti-
communist legislation. Justice Clark’s majority opinion in Wieman v. 
Updegraff91 struck down an Oklahoma statute that required state employees to 
affirm, among other things, that they had not, within the last five years, “‘been 
a member of . . . any agency, party, organization, association, or group 
whatever which has been officially determined by the United States Attorney 
General or other authorized public agency of the United States to be a 
communist front or subversive organization.’”92 Distinguishing Adler, Clark 
emphasized that the New York law required a person to have known the 
purposes of the society or group that he or she had joined.93 In contrast, 
Oklahoma’s law mandated that “the fact of association alone determines 
disloyalty and disqualification; it matter[ed] not whether association existed 
innocently or knowingly.”94  
Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence in Wieman referred to “a right of 
association peculiarly characteristic of our people.”95 That same year, Thomas 
                                                                                                                 
 87. Id. at 490–92. 
 88. Id. at 489. 
 89. Id. at 489–90. 
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Emerson and David Haber’s treatise Political and Civil Rights in the United 
States contended that the “right of association is basic to a democratic 
society.”96 Emerson and Haber asserted that association “embraces not only 
the right to form political associations but also the right to organize business, 
labor, agricultural, cultural, recreational and numerous other groups that 
represent the manifold activities and interests of a democratic people.”97  
E. Harlan and Brennan Join the Court 
In the midst of the Second Red Scare and early hints of a constitutional 
right of association, two men who would deeply influence the development of 
that right arrived at the Supreme Court: John Harlan and William Brennan. 
Justice Brennan, who succeeded Sherman Minton in 1956, became the chief 
intellectual architect of the Warren Court’s civil liberties activism and was 
arguably “the most important jurist of the second half of the century.”98 His 
tenure on the Court included not only the right of association’s first official 
recognition in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson99 but also its 
transformation twenty-six years later in his opinion in Roberts v. United States 
Jaycees.100 Justice Harlan, who replaced Justice Robert Jackson in 1955, 
authored the Court’s opinion in NAACP v. Alabama.101 His judicial philosophy 
is often cast as “conservative” based on his close relationship with Justice 
Felix Frankfurter, his predilection for judicial restraint and deference to 
national security decisions of government officials, and his constant sparring 
with the Warren Court liberals. But this label obscures the complexity of his 
thought.102 Within his first few months on the Court, Harlan expressed 
discomfort over the Smith Act prosecutions and associational restrictions on 
communists and let slip that he had little patience for “McCarthyite 
garbage.”103  
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With respect to the right of association, Harlan’s constitutional 
hermeneutic proved even more important than his concerns about the 
prosecution of communists. He believed that the “full scope” of the liberty in 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause could not be “found in or 
limited by the precise terms of the specific guarantees elsewhere provided in 
the Constitution.”104 For Harlan, the meaning of constitutional law was “one 
not of words, but of history and purposes.”105 This approach required an 
appropriate balancing of past tradition and present reform: 
The balance of which I speak is the balance struck by this country, having 
regard to what history teaches are the traditions from which it developed as 
well as the traditions from which it broke. That tradition is a living thing. A 
decision of this Court which radically departs from it could not long survive, 
while a decision which builds on what has survived is likely to be sound.106 
These views about liberty and tradition gave Harlan an openness to the kind of 
arguments that would later be advanced to ground the right of association in 
the Constitution.  
F. Red Monday 
On Monday, June 17, 1957, with Brennan and Harlan now in place, the 
Court released a quartet of decisions curtailing the government’s anti-
communist efforts in what became known as “Red Monday.”107 Three of the 
decisions checked actions of the federal government. In Service v. Dulles, the 
Court ordered the reinstatement of a federal government employee who had 
been dismissed based on loyalty concerns.108 In Watkins v. United States, the 
Court reversed John Watkins’s contempt conviction following his refusal on 
First Amendment grounds to answer the HUAC’s questions about his alleged 
communist affiliations.109 Yates v. United States, the most important of the 
three decisions against the federal government, involved the appeal of fourteen 
leaders of the Communist Party in California convicted under the Smith Act.110 
Justice Harlan’s majority opinion distinguished advocacy of forcible 
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overthrow of the government as an “abstract principle” on the one hand and 
“advocacy or teaching of action” on the other.111 Following this standard, the 
Court directed that five of the convictions be overturned outright and the other 
nine be remanded for retrial.112 More importantly, Harlan’s statutory 
interpretation effectively ended further Smith Act prosecutions.113 
The fourth decision, Sweezy v. New Hampshire, involved a state rather 
than a federal action.114 The New Hampshire Attorney General had 
subpoenaed Paul Sweezy, the well-known Marxist economist and founder of 
the Monthly Review, to testify about alleged communist affiliations pursuant to 
the New Hampshire Subversive Activities Act of 1951.115 Like Watkins, 
Sweezy refused to answer certain questions on First Amendment grounds.116 
Sweezy was found in contempt and imprisoned.117 The New Hampshire 
Supreme Court upheld his conviction despite its assertion that “the right to 
associate with others for a common purpose, be it political or otherwise, [was 
one of the] individual liberties guaranteed to every citizen by the State and 
Federal Constitutions.”118 Chief Justice Warren’s plurality opinion reversed 
Sweezy’s conviction, concluding that New Hampshire’s statute impermissibly 
“extend[ed] to conduct which is only remotely related to actual subversion.”119 
G. Sweezy, Liberty, and Penumbras 
Sweezy also brought to the foreground an important legal question about 
the right of association: its constitutional source. Thomas Emerson, who 
represented Sweezy before the Court, noted that the New Hampshire Supreme 
Court had referred to “speech and association” rights in its review of Sweezy’s 
conviction.120 Emerson offered two possibilities for the source of that right. 
First, he argued that New Hampshire’s law deprived Sweezy “of liberty and 
property without due process of law, contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment of 
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the Constitution of the United States.”121 Second, he argued that “it can hardly 
be doubted that the requirements of the First Amendment, made applicable to 
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, impose comparable or identical 
limits on state power.”122  
The differences between these arguments complicated the Court’s efforts 
to settle on a jurisprudential framework for the right of association.123 The 
issue centered on how the rights that the New Hampshire court had located in 
“the Federal Constitution” could limit state action. The Supreme Court had 
long ago concluded that the substantive provisions of the Bill of Rights limited 
only the federal government and did not apply to the states.124 But the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause subsequently pronounced—in 
language remarkably similar to the Fifth Amendment—that states could not 
“deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law.”125  
Whether the liberty of the Fourteenth Amendment encompassed specific 
provisions in the Bill of Rights remained unclear at the time of Sweezy. In 
1922, Justice Pitney had written for a majority of the Court that “neither the 
Fourteenth Amendment nor any other provision of the Constitution of the 
United States imposes upon the States any restriction about the ‘freedom of 
speech.’”126 But three years later, Justice Sanford concluded in Gitlow v. New 
York that “we may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the press—
which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress—
are among the fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the 
States.”127  
Although Gitlow made clear that states, like the federal government, could 
not “impair” the freedoms of speech and press, the decision did not identify 
the source of those restrictions. Twelve years later, Justice Cardozo suggested 
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two possibilities in Palko v. Connecticut: (1) that certain provisions contained 
in the Bill of Rights were “brought within the Fourteenth Amendment by a 
process of absorption;”128 and (2) that restrictions against the federal 
government from “the specific pledges of particular amendments” were 
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” and thereby valid against the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment.129 Restating Cardozo’s alternatives 
suggests the following two possibilities: 
(1) The incorporation argument, which holds that the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the specific rights enumerated in the 
First Amendment, thereby making those rights applicable to the states; or  
 
(2) The liberty argument, which holds that rights similar to those in the First 
Amendment were implicit in the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment and could thus be derived independently of the 
First Amendment. 
Justices Douglas, Black, and Frankfurter had previously sparred over the 
differences between the incorporation and liberty arguments. In 1943, 
Douglas’s majority opinion in Murdock v. Pennsylvania referred without 
elaboration to “[t]he First Amendment, which the Fourteenth makes applicable 
to the states.”130 Four years later, Black’s majority opinion in Everson v. Board 
of Education echoed the same language.131 Frankfurter dissented in both 
Murdock and Everson. Two years later, his majority opinion in Wolf v. 
Colorado rebuffed Douglas and Black: “The notion that the ‘due process of 
law’ guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment is shorthand for the first eight 
amendments of the Constitution and thereby incorporates them has been 
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rejected by this Court again and again, after impressive consideration. . . . The 
issue is closed.”132 Frankfurter could not find anything in the text of the 
Fourteenth Amendment that applied the Bill of Rights to the states.133 
Black and Douglas disagreed with Frankfurter not only about the source of 
the constitutional limits on state action but also about the extent of those limits. 
For Black, the rights in the First Amendment were “absolute” and could not be 
restricted by state action.134 Although Douglas did not always go as far as 
Black, he did argue in Murdock that the freedoms of the First Amendment held 
a “preferred position.”135 Frankfurter considered the preferred position 
language a “mischievous phrase”136 that “expresses a complicated process of 
constitutional adjudication by a deceptive formula”137 and “impl[ies] that any 
law touching communication is infected with presumptive invalidity.”138 He 
argued instead that the interests of the government must be weighed against 
the liberty of the Fourteenth Amendment.139 On this view, Frankfurter would 
defer to a legislative judgment if a restriction of speech or assembly had a 
“rational basis.” Justice Jackson described the tension between the two 
positions in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette: 
 In weighing arguments of the parties it is important to distinguish 
between the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as an 
instrument for transmitting the principles of the First Amendment and those 
cases in which it is applied for its own sake. The test of legislation which 
collides with the Fourteenth Amendment, because it also collides with the 
principles of the First, is much more definite than the test when only the 
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Fourteenth is involved. Much of the vagueness of the due process clause 
disappears when the specific prohibitions of the First become its standard. 
The right of a State to regulate, for example, a public utility may well 
include, so far as the due process test is concerned, power to impose all of the 
restrictions which a legislature may have a “rational basis” for adopting. But 
freedoms of speech and of press, of assembly, and of worship may not be 
infringed on such slender grounds. They are susceptible of restriction only to 
prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the State may 
lawfully protect.140  
The upshot of these two perspectives was that the Court would be more likely 
to uphold a state law restricting expressive freedom if it followed the liberty 
argument and more likely to strike down the law if it followed the 
incorporation argument.141 
The Court’s decision in Sweezy v. New Hampshire added a new wrinkle: 
unlike the rights of speech, press, assembly, and religion at issue in earlier 
cases, the right of association appeared nowhere in the Constitution.142 Under 
the liberty argument, association (like any other right enforced against the 
states) was implicit in the liberty of the Fourteenth Amendment.143 But the 
incorporation argument, which claimed that the Fourteenth Amendment 
incorporated provisions found in the First Amendment,144 faced a greater 
hurdle. The only possible explanation to support the incorporation argument 
was that a right implicit in the First Amendment implicitly applied to states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment. That was one more degree of inference 
than the liberty argument. Penumbras formed by emanations, as Douglas 
would later characterize it.145 
Chief Justice Warren’s plurality opinion, joined by Justices Black, 
Douglas, and Brennan, relied on the incorporation argument: “[T]he right to 
engage in political expression and association . . . was enshrined in the First 
Amendment of the Bill of Rights.”146 Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justice 
Harlan, concurred only in the result.147 In Frankfurter’s view, the Court was 
confined to “the limited power to review the action of the States conferred 
upon the Court by the Fourteenth Amendment.”148 The Court had to undertake 
“the narrowly circumscribed but exceedingly difficult task of making the final 
                                                                                                                 
 140. 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943). 
 141. There were, of course, phrasings ambiguous enough to be consistent with both 
alternatives. See, e.g., Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 325 (1958) (“[The] fundamental 
right [of speech] is made free from congressional abridgment by the First Amendment and is 
protected by the Fourteenth from invasion by state action.”). 
 142. 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (plurality opinion).  
 143. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324–25 (1937).  
 144. See id. at 326.  
 145. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). 
 146. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250. 
 147. Id. at 255 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 148. Id. at 255–56. 
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judicial accommodation between the competing weighty claims that underlie 
all such questions of due process.”149 Frankfurter made no reference to the 
First Amendment but relied instead upon “‘the concept of ordered liberty’ 
implicit in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”150 His 
concurrence rested on “a judicial judgment in balancing two contending 
principles—the right of a citizen to political privacy, as protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and the right of the State to self-protection.”151  
III. NAACP V. ALABAMA 
The divide between the liberty argument and the incorporation argument 
persisted the following year when the Court formally recognized a 
constitutional right of association in NAACP v. Alabama, a case that shifted 
the Court’s focus on group autonomy from the government’s anti-communist 
efforts to the Civil Rights Movement in the South.152  
A. The Growing Civil Rights Movement 
The proximity between a waning but still active concern over domestic 
communism and the expanding Civil Rights Movement led to widely 
divergent claims about the relationship between the two. On the one hand, the 
federal government increasingly viewed segregation as undercutting its stance 
against communist ideology. Its amicus brief in Brown v. Board of Education 
argued that “[t]he United States is trying to prove to the people of the world, of 
every nationality, race, and color, that a free democracy is the most civilized 
and most secure form of government yet devised by man”153 and that 
segregation “jeopardize[d] the effective maintenance of our moral leadership 
of the free and democratic nations of the world.”154 This view prevailed in the 
northern media as well. The New York Times quoted John Gange’s assertion 
that “the decision ‘will immensely enhance our role as a leader of the 
democracies of the world.’”155 The Washington Post hailed that with Brown, 
                                                                                                                 
 149. Id. at 256. 
 150. Id. at 266 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). 
 151. Id. at 266–267. Justice Clark’s dissent erroneously concludes that Justice Frankfurter 
concurred “on the ground that Sweezy’s rights under the First Amendment ha[d] been violated.” 
Id. at 268 (Clark, J., dissenting). Powe writes that Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence “introduced 
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entrenching on a constitutional right, a state must be acting because of a compelling state 
interest.” POWE, supra note 37, at 97. 
 152. 357 U.S. 450 (1958).  
 153. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 6, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 
483 (1954) (Nos. 8, 101, 191, 413, 448). 
 154. Id. at 8. 
 155. Court Said to End ‘A Sense of Guilt’: Virginia School Head Asserts U.S. Prestige Will 
Rise as Result of Anti-Bias Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1954, at 18 (quoting John Gange, Dir., 
Woodrow Wilson Sch. of Foreign Affairs, Univ. of Va.). 
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“America is rid of an incubus which impeded and embarrassed it in all of its 
relations with the world.”156  
In contrast to these efforts to link integration with democracy, southern 
conservatives argued that integration advocates were controlled by communist 
forces.157 The link between “red” and “black” solidified in the minds of many 
southerners during the 1930s when the Communist Party’s legal arm, the 
International Labor Defense, undertook the celebrated defenses of Angelo 
Herndon and the “Scottsboro Boys.”158 But it was the “southern red scare” of 
the 1950s that pressed the connections between these two “radical” 
movements beyond the realm of plausibility.159 Although segregationists 
“never found any good evidence that Communists had a perceptible influence 
in the NAACP,”160 they nevertheless perpetuated a link “to discredit the civil 
rights movement by associating it with the nation’s greatest enemy.”161 
Chief Justice Warren’s opinion in Brown fueled efforts to steer anti-
communist sentiment toward civil rights activists. His famous footnote eleven 
cited four non-legal sources—including Myrdal and two other authors who 
“had what passed for communist leanings during that era.”162 In response to 
the decision, Georgia’s lieutenant governor denounced “[t]he meddlers, 
demagogues, race baiters and Communists in the United States [who] are 
determined to destroy every vestige of states’ rights.”163 Mississippi Senator 
James Eastland, who at the time chaired both the Senate Judiciary Committee 
                                                                                                                 
 156. Equal Education for All, WASH. POST, May 19, 1954, at 14. 
 157. JEFF WOODS, BLACK STRUGGLE, RED SCARE: SEGREGATION AND ANTI-COMMUNISM IN 
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NAACP.” Id., reprinted in Gibson, 372 U.S. at 581. 
 160. WOODS, supra note 157, at 53.  
 161. Id. at 5. 
 162. POWE, supra note 37, at 42. Powe writes that the footnote “reduced both the legal and 
moral force of the opinion.” Id. at 44. 
 163. John N. Popham, Reaction of South: ‘Breathing Spell’ for Adjustment Tempers 
Region’s Feelings, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1954, at 1, quoted in POWE, supra note 37, at 39. 
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and the SISS, argued that the Court in Brown had “responded to a radical, pro-
Communist political movement in this country.”164 Eastland, Senator John 
McClellan of Arkansas, and Representative Edwin Willis of Louisiana used 
their positions on the SISS, HUAC, and other investigative subcommittees to 
hold public hearings on “Communist influence in civil rights protests.”165  
One of the most forceful advocates of the link between communism and 
civil rights in the South was Mississippi Circuit Court Judge Tom P. Brady. 
Lucas Powe has written that “Brady saw Brown as a virtual communist plot to 
mandate the amalgamation of the races.”166 The summer after the Court’s 
decision, Brady spearheaded the creation of the Citizens’ Councils, which 
purported to be a “nonviolent alternative to the Ku Klux Klan” that would 
ensure financial and economic consequences to anyone supporting 
integration.167 According to Neil McMillen, “the nexus between the NAACP 
and the international Communist apparatus was the central motif of literally 
hundreds of Council speeches and publications.”168 
In late 1954 and early 1955, Citizens’ Councils sprang up across Alabama. 
From October to December 1955 alone, “membership in the Alabama 
Citizens’ Councils grew from a few hundred to twenty thousand.”169 The 
Councils made clear their intentions to bury Alabama civil rights advocates 
under economic and social pressures: 
The white population in this country controls the money, and this is an 
advantage that the council will use in a fight to legally maintain complete 
segregation of the races. We intend to make it difficult, if not impossible, for 
                                                                                                                 
 164. Senator James O. Eastland, Address at the Association of Citizens’ Councils of 
Mississippi Statewide Convention: We’ve Reached Era of Judicial Tyranny (Dec. 1, 1955), 
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 165. WOODS, supra note 157, at 5. Eastland was “one of the era’s leading racists” and 
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 169. POWE, supra note 37, at 68. 
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any Negro who advocates desegregation to find and hold a job, get credit or 
renew a mortgage.170  
This background highlights the importance of the membership list that would 
be at issue in NAACP v. Alabama. Once the names of NAACP members 
became public, the Citizens’ Councils would ensure dire consequences.171  
B. Membership Lists and the Right of Association 
The controversy leading up to NAACP v. Alabama began in June of 1956 
when Alabama Attorney General John Patterson initiated an action to enjoin 
the NAACP from operating within the state.172 The state trial court judge, who 
had once stated in a campaign speech that he “intend[ed] to deal the NAACP . 
. . a mortal blow from which they shall never recover,”173 issued the injunction 
ex parte.174 The judge also ordered the NAACP to produce its membership list, 
which Patterson had requested as part of a records review.175 Knowing what 
this disclosure would mean given the activity of the Citizens’ Councils, the 
NAACP refused.176 The judge responded with a $10,000 contempt fine, which 
he increased to $100,000 after five days.177 The Alabama Supreme Court 
rejected the NAACP’s appeal of the judge’s order through a series of 
disingenuous procedural rulings.178 The NAACP then appealed to the U.S. 
Supreme Court.179 
In its petition for certiorari, the NAACP implicitly made the incorporation 
argument. It contended that the actions of Patterson and the Alabama courts 
amounted to “a serious interference with essential freedom of speech, freedom 
of assembly, freedom of association, and the right to petition,”180 that they 
                                                                                                                 
 170. Alabama, S. SCH. NEWS, Jan. 6, 1955, at 2, quoted in Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 
20, Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (No. 91).  
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represented “an unlawful restraint by the State of Alabama of First 
Amendment rights,”181 and that “[t]here can be no doubt that First Amendment 
rights are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”182 In contrast, the 
NAACP’s brief endorsed the liberty argument: the organization and its 
members were “merely invoking their constitutionally protected rights of free 
speech and free association guaranteed under the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”183 The brief elaborated that “[t]he unimpaired 
maintenance of freedom of association and free speech is considered essential 
to our political integrity”184 and quoted from Justice Frankfurter’s Wieman 
concurrence that the right of association was “peculiarly characteristic of our 
people.”185  
In its reply brief, the State of Alabama conceded that the NAACP, as a 
corporation, held rights of free speech and free press that were safeguarded by 
the Fourteenth Amendment.186 However, the State argued that a corporation’s 
rights “do not include freedom of association, a right of privacy, or the right to 
assert the privilege of others, including members.”187 Thus, even if its 
members held a right of free association, the NAACP, as a corporation, could 
not assert that right.188  
First Amendment scholar Leo Pfeffer submitted an amicus brief on behalf 
of a number of organizations, including among others, the American Jewish 
Congress, American Baptist Convention, Commission on Christian Social 
Progress, ACLU, and American Veterans Committee.189 Although the Court 
refused to consider the brief,190 Pfeffer’s arguments are preserved in the record 
and illuminate the conflation of the constitutional and doctrinal concepts in the 
case. 
Pfeffer was best known for his work on the First Amendment’s religion 
clauses, but his 1956 book, The Liberties of an American, included a section 
                                                                                                                 
 181. Id. at 18. 
 182. See id. at 27 (“There can be no doubt that First Amendment rights are protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment . . . .”).  
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on assembly and association.191 In the book, he asserted that despite the 
absence of any mention of association in the Bill of Rights, “there can be little 
doubt that [the Founding Fathers] recognized the right to associate as a liberty 
of Americans.”192 He elaborated by drawing a distinction between association 
and assembly: 
When men band together for a single public demonstration of feeling or 
expression of a grievance they exercise their right of assembly; when they 
continue banding and acting together until the grievance is redressed they 
exercise their right of association. Freedom of indefinite or permanent 
association is as fundamental to democracy and as much a liberty of 
Americans as freedom of temporary assembly, and no less entitled to 
constitutional protection.193  
But a few sentences later, Pfeffer collapsed the distinction, referring to “the 
right of assembly (i.e., association).”194 
In his amicus brief, Pfeffer opened by appealing to both the liberty 
argument and the incorporation argument:  
 Freedom of association is a liberty guaranteed against Federal 
infringement by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
against state infringement by the Fourteenth. In addition it is one of the co-
equal guarantees of the First Amendment applied to the states by the 
Fourteenth.195 
In support of the liberty argument, Pfeffer contended that “[a] constitutional 
provision protecting liberty against arbitrary governmental deprivation would 
have little meaning if it did not encompass the freedom of men to associate 
with each other.”196 Turning to the incorporation argument, Pfeffer revealed 
the same blurring between association and assembly that he had exhibited in 
The Liberties of an American. He argued on the one hand that “‘freedom of 
association’ may be viewed as a right to conduct indefinitely continuing 
assemblies.”197 However, he asserted on the other hand that “freedom of 
assembly is not limited to occasional meetings but includes the organization of 
associations on a permanent basis.”198 This latter argument suggested a third 
way to ground association in the Constitution:  
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(3) The assembly argument, which holds that the right of association is part 
of the right of assembly and is therefore accorded the same deference and 
applicable to the states to the same extent as the right of assembly. 
Although the assembly argument garnered little attention from the Court (other 
than from Justices Black and Douglas, who raised it infrequently in later 
cases),199 it could have provided a stronger grounding for the right of 
association in the right of assembly.200 This is not to suggest that the right of 
assembly was immune to political pressure—as previously noted, its 
“preferred place” had already been attenuated by some of the early communist 
cases of the 1950s.201 Nonetheless, connecting a new right of association to the 
existing right of assembly would have provided a more direct constitutional 
link than either the incorporation argument or the liberty argument.  
Oral argument in NAACP v. Alabama focused almost entirely on 
procedural and jurisdictional questions related to Alabama state law.202 The 
Justices showed little interest in the freedom of association and asked no 
questions about its constitutional basis.203 NAACP attorney Robert L. Carter, 
who had advanced the incorporation argument in his petition for certiorari and 
the liberty argument in his brief, now reverted back to the incorporation 
argument: the denial of “free speech and freedom of association” infringed 
upon a right “protected by the First Amendment.”204 Alabama Assistant 
Attorney General Edmon L. Rinehart made no argument regarding the 
constitutional source of association but implicitly conceded its status as an 
individual right.205  
The Justices agreed that Alabama had infringed upon the associational 
rights of the members of the NAACP.206 After they met in conference, Chief 
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 200. See generally Inazu, supra note 3 (describing the right of assembly’s history). 
 201. See supra Part II.B–C. 
 202. See Recording of Oral Argument, Parts 1 & 2, Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (No. 91), 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1950-1959/1957/1957_91.  
 203. See id.   
 204. Recording of Oral Argument, Part 1 at 00:32:15, Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (No. 91), 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1950-1959/1957/1957_91. 
 205. Id. at 00:51:16–1:01:20. Rinehart instead challenged the NAACP’s attempt to assert 
the right as a corporation or on behalf of its members, arguing that Watkins and Sweezy had 
addressed assertions of individual rights, not the rights of a group. Id. at 00:51:45. He intimated 
only once that the state could constrain an individual’s right of association, arguing 
unconvincingly that a member of the NAACP would be required to confirm his or her 
membership if asked to do so during a judicial hearing. Id. at 1:00:11–1:01:15. Rinehart also 
argued vehemently that the right of association was not implicated because the case involved no 
state action: any adverse treatment following disclosure of membership would come from 
private persons or businesses, not the state. Id. at 00:54:30–00:58:15. For good measure, 
Rinehart implausibly contended that the possibility of these private actions was “pure 
speculation.” Id. at 00:54:45, 00:58:07. 
 206. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460–63, 466. 
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Justice Warren assigned the opinion to Justice Harlan with the understanding 
that it would be unsigned or per curiam, in keeping with the Court’s practice in 
post-Brown race cases.207 But Harlan soon realized that “it would reflect 
adversely on the Court were [it] to dispose of the case without a fully reasoned 
opinion” and convinced his colleagues that he should write a full opinion.208 
Harlan’s opinion for the unanimous Court framed the constitutional 
question in terms of the “fundamental freedoms protected by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”209 He began his constitutional analysis 
by citing De Jonge v. Oregon210 and Thomas v. Collins211 to support the 
principle that “[e]ffective advocacy of both public and private points of view, 
particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association, 
as th[e] Court ha[d] more than once recognized by remarking upon the close 
nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly.”212 De Jonge and 
Thomas had established that the freedom of assembly applied to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment,213 that it covered political, economic, 
religious, and secular matters,214 and that it could only be restricted if “justified 
by clear public interest, threatened not doubtfully or remotely, but by clear and 
present danger.”215 Based on these precedents, Harlan could have resolved the 
case entirely on the freedom of assembly. He instead shifted his attention away 
from assembly, writing in the next sentence that “[i]t is beyond debate that 
freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an 
inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.”216 Harlan 
recognized that the NAACP members had a “constitutionally protected right of 
association”217 that meant they could “pursue their lawful private interests 
privately and . . . associate freely with others in so doing.”218 He concluded 
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that the Alabama courts had substantially restrained these members’ “right to 
freedom of association.”219  
Writing a few years after NAACP v. Alabama, Thomas Emerson suggested 
that Harlan “initially treated freedom of association as derivative from the first 
amendment rights to freedom of speech and assembly, and as ancillary to 
them” but later “elevated freedom of association to an independent right, 
possessing an equal status with the other rights specifically enumerated in the 
first amendment.”220 But Harlan’s opinion is more ambiguous than Emerson 
suggests, and it is not clear that he relied on the First Amendment to ground 
association—the opinion, in fact, never mentions the First Amendment.  
C. Unanimity Masking Division? 
Justice Harlan’s vagueness about the source of the right of association may 
explain how he marshaled a unanimous opinion.221 In an earlier draft opinion 
that he circulated to the other members of the Court, Harlan had written: “It is 
of course firmly established that the protection given by the First Amendment 
against federal invasion of such rights is afforded by the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment against state action.”222 Justices Douglas and 
Frankfurter were both troubled by the draft language, but for opposite reasons. 
Frankfurter pushed for Harlan to rely expressly on the liberty argument and 
avoid any mention of the First Amendment:  
Why in heaven’s name must we, whenever some discussion under the Due 
Process Clause is involved, get off speeches about the First Amendment? 
Why can’t you . . . state in two or three sentences that to ask disclosure of 
membership . . . is, in the light of prior decisions, merely citing them, an 
invasion of the free area of activity under the Fourteenth Amendment not 
overcome by any solid, as against a very tenuous, interest of the state in 
prying into such freedom of action by individuals.223  
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Douglas, on the other hand, feared that Harlan’s due process analysis diluted 
the First Amendment as applied to the states: 
 
[I]f the right of free speech is watered down by the Due Process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and made subject to state regulation, then the police 
power of the state has a pretty broad area for application. If we are dealing 
here with something that can be regulated then I think we are in very deep 
water in this case, as for the life of me I do not see why a state could not have 
a rational judgment for believing that an organization like the NAACP was a 
source of a lot of trouble, friction, and unrest.224 
Douglas expressed particular concern over Frankfurter’s proposed balancing 
approach (which Harlan had endorsed in earlier opinions): “I thought that 
when we dealt with these racial problems and with free speech and free 
assembly and religious problems we were dealing with something that is right 
close to the absolute.”225  
Harlan had no affinity for Douglas’s argument, but he also expressed “the 
most serious misgivings about” Frankfurter’s advice.226 Nonetheless, Harlan 
eliminated any reference to the First Amendment in his revised draft.227 This 
concerned Justice Black, who thought that the opinion now read “as though the 
First Amendment did not exist.”228 Black notified Harlan that he planned to 
submit a brief concurring opinion to specify “that the state has here violated 
the basic freedoms of press, speech and assembly, immunized from federal 
abridgement by the First Amendment, and made applica[ble] as a prohibition 
against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.”229 But he relented six days 
                                                                                                                 
 224. Letter from William O. Douglas, Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to John M. 
Harlan, Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Apr. 22, 1958), reprinted in THE DOUGLAS 
LETTERS: SELECTIONS FROM THE PRIVATE PAPERS OF JUSTICE WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS 198 (Melvin 
I. Urofsky ed., 1987). Justice Black also expressed initial concerns to Justice Harlan. See 
YARBROUGH, supra note 103, at 126. 
 225. UROFSKY, supra note 224, at 198. Dissenting from an opinion handed down the same 
day as NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, Justice Douglas wrote that the liberties contained 
in the First Amendment  
include the right to believe what one chooses, the right to differ from his neighbor, the right 
to pick and choose the political philosophy that he likes best, the right to associate with 
whomever he chooses, the right to join the groups he prefers, the privilege of selecting his 
own path to salvation.  
Beilan v. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 357 U.S. 399, 412–13 (1958) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 226. YARBROUGH, supra note 103, at 126 (quoting Letter from John M. Harlan, Associate 
Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Felix Frankfurter, Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Apr. 
24, 1958) (Harlan Papers, Box 46). 
 227. See id. 
 228. Id. at 126 (quoting Letter from Hugo L. Black, Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, 
to John M. Harlan, Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (May 2, 1958) (Harlan Papers, Box 
46). 
 229. Id. (quoting Letter from Hugo L. Black to John M. Harlan, supra note 228) (alteration 
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later, writing to Harlan that although he “would prefer [the Court’s] holding be 
supported by different reasoning,” he realized that doing so would prevent the 
unanimous decision that was so important to the Court in cases involving 
questions of race.230  
In the midst of satisfying Frankfurter, Douglas, and Black, Harlan had one 
other hurdle to clear with his opinion. The State of Alabama had argued that 
the Court was bound by its 1928 opinion in Bryant v. Zimmerman, in which an 
8–1 majority had upheld a New York registration and membership disclosure 
law against a challenge from a member of the Ku Klux Klan.231 The Bryant 
Court dismissed the Klan member’s assertion of a Fourteenth Amendment due 
process liberty “right of membership in the association,” concluding that this 
right “must yield to the rightful exertion of the police power.”232 The Court 
noted: 
There can be no doubt that under that power the State may prescribe and 
apply to associations having an oath-bound membership any reasonable 
regulation calculated to confine their purposes and activities within limits 
which are consistent with the rights of others and the public welfare. . . . 
[R]equiring [membership lists] to be supplied for the public files will operate 
as an effective or substantial deterrent from the violations of public and 
private right to which the association might be tempted if such a disclosure 
were not required.233  
This broad deference to the police power, with explicit approval of publicly 
disclosing the Klan’s membership list, may have prompted Douglas’s concern 
that it would be difficult to account for Bryant if Harlan resolved NAACP v. 
Alabama under the liberty argument.  
Distinguishing the NAACP from the Klan, Harlan concluded that Bryant 
“was based on the particular character of the Klan’s activities, involving acts 
of unlawful intimidation and violence.”234 Thus, by relying on the “markedly 
different considerations in terms of the interest of the State in obtaining 
                                                                                                                 
in original). 
 230. Id. at 162 (quoting Handwritten Note from Hugo L. Black, Associate Justice, U.S. 
Supreme Court, to John M. Harlan, Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (May 8, 1958). Clark 
threatened to dissent on procedural grounds, but Frankfurter persuaded him to join the majority 
on the merits. Id. at 162–163. The Justices realized that “unanimity was considered crucial in 
racial cases.” Id. at 162. 
 231. 278 U.S. 63 (1928). 
 232. Id. at 72. 
 233. Id. 
 234. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 465 (1958). Harlan also 
attempted a less plausible distinction, noting that “the situation before [the Court was] 
significantly different from that in Bryant, because the organization there had made no effort to 
comply with any of the requirements of New York’s statute but rather had refused to furnish the 
State with any information as to its local activities.” Id. at 465–66. 
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disclosure,” he was able to distinguish Bryant without overruling it.235 This 
distinction—based on the nature of the group rather than the nature of the 
restriction—combined with Harlan’s nebulous final wording which towed an 
ambiguous middle line to appease the concerns raised by Frankfurter, Douglas 
and Black, left uncertain both the right of association’s constitutional source 
and its applicability in other contexts. 
IV. ASSOCIATION AFTER NAACP V. ALABAMA 
It was clear that the Court had broken new constitutional ground in 
NAACP v. Alabama, but specifying exactly what had taken place proved 
elusive. The Washington Post editorialized that the Court had “cut through the 
flummery of Alabama’s treatment of the NAACP and dealt with it as an 
outright violation of the freedom of assembly.”236 The New York Times 
suggested that the Court had relied on the liberty argument, writing that the 
decision rested upon “one of the ‘fundamental freedoms’ guaranteed by the 
due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.”237 Meanwhile, the first 
round of law review commentary endorsed the incorporation argument, 
contending that Justice Harlan’s opinion had located the freedom of 
association in the First Amendment. The Ohio State Law Journal tied the new 
freedom of association to the freedom of assembly and suggested that the 
decision reinforced that “First amendment rights occupy a high position in the 
hierarchy of constitutional freedoms and may be limited only when the state 
has a compelling interest.”238 The Brooklyn Law Review concluded that the 
“[f]reedom of association, although not mentioned in the first amendment, was 
included therein.”239 The George Washington Law Review suggested that “the 
new freedom of association is a cognate of . . . first amendment freedoms and 
enjoys coordinately their preferred status.”240 The only thing clear from these 
initial reactions was that nobody was clear about the source or scope of the 
new right of association.  
                                                                                                                 
 235. Id. at 465. 
 236. Freedom of Association, WASH. POST, July 3, 1958, at A12 (emphasis added). 
 237. Freedom to Associate, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1958, at 28. 
 238. Frank M. Hays, Recent Development, State May Not Compel Association to Disclose 
Names of Members, 20 OHIO ST. L.J. 123, 124–25, 124 n.8 (1959); cf. id. at 126 (“[T]he Court 
follow[ed] quite closely its previous holdings in the area of free speech and assembly.”). 
 239. Case Comment, 25 BROOK. L. REV. 122, 123 (1958) (footnotes omitted).  
 240. Myron W. Solter, Editorial Note, Freedom of Association—A New and Fundamental 
Civil Right, 27 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 653, 672 (1959). The Harvard Law Review’s summary of 
NAACP v. Alabama noted that the holding rested on “freedom of association” but did not 
elaborate on the nature or source of that freedom. The Supreme Court, 1957 Term—
Constitutional Law, 72 HARV. L. REV. 193, 194 (1958). 
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A. Uphaus and Barenblatt: Ducking the Hard Question 
The Court’s first opportunities to apply NAACP v. Alabama came the 
following term in Uphaus v. Wyman241 and Barenblatt v. United States,242 two 
cases involving inquiries into alleged communist affiliations. The newly 
declared freedom of association could have muted the overzealous 
investigations that occurred during the waning days of the McCarthy era.243 In 
the New York Times, Anthony Lewis characterized NAACP v. Alabama as “an 
illustration of the [C]ourt’s concern for the Constitutional right to express 
beliefs and ideas, however unpopular, through effective means.”244 But when 
the Court turned from the NAACP to the Communist Party, it became clear 
that not all associations were created equal.  
Uphaus involved another inquiry by New Hampshire’s Attorney General 
Louis Wyman, who had been on the losing end of the Court’s Sweezy decision 
two years earlier.245 Without mentioning the freedom of association, Justice 
Clark suggested that the case turned on “the single question of whether New 
Hampshire, under the facts here, is precluded from compelling the production 
of the documents by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”246 Justice Clark concluded that the “governmental interest in 
self-preservation is sufficiently compelling to subordinate the interest in 
associational privacy.”247 Justice Brennan filed a lengthy dissent premised on 
“the constitutionally protected rights of speech and assembly.”248 Because 
Brennan saw “no valid legislative interest” behind Wyman’s inquiry, he did 
not see the need for any balancing of interests.249 He thought that the “Court’s 
                                                                                                                 
 241. 360 U.S. 72 (1959). 
 242. 360 U.S. 109 (1959). 
 243. It is important to keep in mind that the Supreme Court’s application of Patterson to 
communist cases occurred after the height of McCarthyism had already come and gone. See 
generally GOLDSTEIN, supra note 16, at 205 (noting the U.S. Senate’s censure of McCarthy in 
late 1954 and the “increasingly withering and sustained attack from broad sectors of American 
society” on the government’s loyalty program by 1955). This timing makes the Court’s 
disparate treatment of communists all the more remarkable. For a more recent comparison, we 
might contrast the broad bipartisan support for the USA PATRIOT Act in the months following 
the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks with more critical views that emerged just a few years 
later.  
 244. Anthony Lewis, High Court Term a Significant One, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 1958, at 29. 
 245. See Uphaus, 360 U.S. at 73–74. 
 246. Id. at 77. 
 247. Id. at 81. 
 248. Id. at 82 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan’s dissent conflated speech, 
expression, assembly, association, and privacy, referring at times to the “rights of association 
and expression,” id. at 106, and “the interest in privacy as it relates to freedom of speech and 
assembly.” Id. at 107–08. But he made his most frequent appeals to the constitutional rights of 
“speech and assembly.” Id. at 82, 83, 105, 108. Chief Justice Warren, Justice Black, and Justice 
Douglas joined Justice Brennan’s dissent. 
 249. Id. at 106. Justice Brennan wrote:  
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approach to a very similar problem in NAACP v. Alabama should furnish a 
guide to the proper course of decision here.”250  
Barenblatt, which unlike NAACP v. Alabama and Uphaus involved a 
congressional action, gave the Court its first opportunity to explain how the 
new right of association applied to the federal government.251 There were two 
possibilities. If association were a First Amendment right, then it would apply 
directly to actions of Congress.252 If, on the other hand, association were 
rooted in liberty, it presumably would apply to the federal government through 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.253 Justice Harlan’s opinion 
for the Court unambiguously accepted the former view, stating that “[t]he 
precise constitutional issue confronting us is whether the Subcommittee’s 
inquiry into [Barenblatt]’s past or present membership in the Communist Party 
transgressed the provisions of the First Amendment.”254  
Barenblatt presented facts similar to those in Watkins v. United States, one 
of the Court’s 1957 “Red Monday” decisions.255 The HUAC had summoned 
Barenblatt, who had been a psychology instructor at Vassar College, to 
question him about his alleged affiliation with the Communist Party while he 
had been a graduate student at the University of Michigan.256 Like Watkins, 
Barenblatt refused to answer on First Amendment grounds.257 Writing for the 
majority in Watkins, Chief Justice Warren had skirted the First Amendment 
challenge, instead concluding in general due process terms that Watkins could 
not reasonably have been expected to know which questions from the HUAC 
                                                                                                                 
  The Court describes the inquiry we must make in this matter as a balancing of 
interests. I think I have indicated that there has been no valid legislative interest of the 
State actually defined and shown in the investigation as it operated, so that there is really 
nothing against which the appellant's rights of association and expression can be balanced.  
Id. 
 250. Id. at 103 (citation omitted). 
 251. See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111–12 (1959). 
 252. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . .”). 
 253. The right of association could not be applied to the federal government through the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because that provision applies only to 
“State[s].” See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fifth Amendment restricts the federal 
government’s “depriv[ation] of . . . liberty . . . without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. 
V. 
 254. Barenblatt, 360 U.S. at 126 (footnotes omitted); see also id. (“Undeniably, the First 
Amendment in some circumstances protects an individual from being compelled to disclose his 
associational relationships.”). Justice Harlan’s conclusion that the right of association’s 
limitation on the federal government was found in the First Amendment is not inconsistent with 
his view that the right of association’s limitation on state action was in the Fourteenth 
Amendment. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958). That was, in 
essence, how he viewed rights specifically enumerated in the First Amendment. 
 255. See supra Part II.F. 
 256. Barenblatt, 360 U.S. at 113–114. 
 257. Id. at 114.  
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were pertinent to its legitimate inquiry.258 Justice Harlan, writing for the Court 
in Barenblatt, distinguished Watkins on the basis that the HUAC’s questions to 
Barenblatt were pertinent to its inquiry.259  
Like Clark in Uphaus, Harlan largely eschewed the language of a right of 
association and instead used a “balancing of interests” analysis.260 Justice 
Frankfurter had been pushing for this approach for some time, first in his 
Dennis concurrence261 and more recently in his Sweezy concurrence.262 When 
Harlan circulated a draft of his Barenblatt opinion, Frankfurter responded with 
the suggestion that Harlan include “a few pungent paragraphs putting the case 
in its setting.”263 This should happen “[b]efore the reader gets involved in the 
details of balancing.”264 Harlan’s revised opinion incorporated Frankfurter’s 
suggestions and emphasized “the close nexus between the Communist Party 
and violent overthrow of government.”265  
However, as Lucas Powe notes, Harlan never explained how the 
government’s “right of self preservation”266 related to “asking a former 
psychology instructor at Vassar about meetings when he was a graduate 
student.”267 Moreover, Harlan failed to articulate a single interest of 
Barenblatt’s which could be balanced against the government’s interests, 
noting only that “the record is barren of other factors which in themselves 
might sometimes lead to the conclusion that the individual interests at stake 
were not subordinate to those of the state.”268 Justice Black’s dissent quipped 
                                                                                                                 
 258. See Watkins, 354 U.S. at 215. Frankfurter later “refer[red] often to Warren’s efforts as 
that ‘god-awful Watkins opinion.’” YARBROUGH, supra note 103, at 201 (quoting Frankfurter). 
 259. Barenblatt, 360 U.S. at 123–25. 
 260. See id. at 126–34. 
 261. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 518–19 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) 
(“Our judgment is thus solicited on a conflict of interests of the utmost concern to the well-being 
of the country. This conflict of interests cannot be resolved by a dogmatic preference for one or 
the other, nor by a sonorous formula which is in fact only a euphemistic disguise for an 
unresolved conflict. If adjudication is to be a rational process, we cannot escape a candid 
examination of the conflicting claims with full recognition that both are supported by weighty 
title-deeds.”). 
 262. See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 266–67 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring) (“[T]his is a conclusion based on a judicial judgment in balancing two contending 
principles—the right of a citizen to political privacy, as protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and the right of the State to self-protection. And striking the balance implies the 
exercise of judgment. This is the inescapable judicial task in giving substantive content, legally 
enforced, to the Due Process Clause, and it is a task ultimately committed to this Court.”).  
 263. Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to John M. 
Harlan, Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (June 3, 1959) (Harlan Papers, Box 533), quoted 
in YARBROUGH, supra note 103, at 202. 
 264. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to John M. Harlan, supra note 263, quoted in 
YARBROUGH, supra note 103, at 202. 
 265. Barenblatt, 360 U.S. at 128. 
 266. See id. at 128. 
 267. POWE, supra note 37, at 144. 
 268. Barenblatt, 360 U.S. at 134. 
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that Harlan had rewritten the First Amendment to read that “Congress shall 
pass no law abridging freedom of speech, press, assembly and petition, unless 
Congress and the Supreme Court reach the joint conclusion that on balance the 
interest of the Government in stifling these freedoms is greater than the 
interest of the people in having them exercised.”269 In a poignant passage, 
Black added: 
 The fact is that once we allow any group which has some political aims 
or ideas to be driven from the ballot and from the battle for men’s minds 
because some of its members are bad and some of its tenets are illegal, no 
group is safe. . . . History should teach us . . . that in times of high emotional 
excitement minority parties and groups which advocate extremely unpopular 
social or governmental innovations will always be typed as criminal gangs 
and attempts will always be made to drive them out. It was knowledge of this 
fact, and of its great dangers, that caused the Founders of our land to enact 
the First Amendment as a guarantee that neither Congress nor the people 
would do anything to hinder or destroy the capacity of individuals and groups 
to seek converts and votes for any cause, however radical or unpalatable their 
principles might seem under the accepted notions of the time.270  
Neither Clark’s opinion in Uphaus nor Harlan’s opinion in Barenblatt 
elaborated on the constitutional right of association that the Court had 
recognized its previous term. Harlan referred only once to “rights of 
association assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”271 Clark mentioned “associational privacy” made applicable 
through “the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”272 Even 
though both of these communist cases squarely implicated associational 
freedoms, the Court would not revisit the new right until Bates v. City of Little 
Rock,273 a case with facts remarkably similar to those in NAACP v. Alabama.  
B. Applying the Right of Association 
In Bates, the Court reviewed the convictions of two NAACP records 
custodians who had refused to produce local membership lists as required by 
ordinances in two Arkansas cities.274 Like the disclosure order that had led to 
the Alabama litigation, the Arkansas ordinances were designed to cripple the 
NAACP.275 Relying on the freedom of association, Justice Stewart’s majority 
                                                                                                                 
 269. Id. at 143 (Black, J., dissenting). Justices Douglas and Warren joined the dissent. 
Justice Brennan dissented separately. 
 270. Id. at 150–51. Justice Black rested his dissent, in part, on the First Amendment rights 
of speech and association. Id. at 140–53. 
 271. Id. at 127. 
 272. Uphaus, 360 U.S. at 78, 77. 
 273. 361 U.S. 516 (1960). 
 274. Id. at 516–21. 
 275. See Joseph B. Robison, Protection of Associations from Compulsory Disclosure of 
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opinion cited De Jonge and NAACP v. Alabama to link association with 
assembly: 
 Like freedom of speech and a free press, the right of peaceable assembly 
was considered by the Framers of our Constitution to lie at the foundation of 
a government based upon the consent of an informed citizenry—a 
government dedicated to the establishment of justice and the preservation of 
liberty. And it is now beyond dispute that freedom of association for the 
purpose of advancing ideas and airing grievances is protected by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by the States.276 
As with Justice Harlan’s wording in NAACP v. Alabama, Justice Stewart’s 
language could be read to support either the incorporation argument or the 
liberty argument. To confuse matters further, Justices Black and Douglas 
raised the assembly argument in a joint concurrence: 
 We concur in the judgment and substantially with the opinion because 
we think the facts show that the ordinances as here applied violate freedom of 
speech and assembly guaranteed by the First Amendment which this Court 
has many times held was made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth 
Amendment . . . . One of those rights, freedom of assembly, includes of 
course freedom of association; and it is entitled to no less protection than any 
other First Amendment right.277  
Ten months after Bates, Justice Stewart again wrote for the majority in 
Shelton v. Tucker.278 Shelton involved a challenge to an Arkansas statute that 
required every teacher at a state-supported school or college to file an annual 
affidavit disclosing all organizations to which the teacher had belonged or 
regularly contributed in the previous five years.279 Although the Arkansas 
statute was not overtly aimed at the NAACP, the affidavit requirement clearly 
targeted the group.280 In Bates, Stewart had cited De Jonge to link association 
                                                                                                                 
Membership, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 614, 615 (1958). Similar statutory efforts unfolded in Virginia, 
Texas, and Tennessee. Id. at 616. Louisiana attacked the NAACP through an existing state law 
that had originally been drafted to combat the Ku Klux Klan. Id. at 617. 
 276. 361 U.S. at 522–23 (citations omitted). 
 277. Id. at 527–28 (Black and Douglas, JJ., concurring) (emphasis added). A note in the 
Virginia Law Review published after Bates suggested that “the concept of ‘freedom of 
association’ illustrates the development of a judicial technique for dealing with [the particular 
kind of situation at issue in NAACP v. Alabama and Bates] rather than the enunciation of an 
independent constitutional right.” Peter R. Fisher, Note, Freedom of Association: Constitutional 
Right or Judicial Technique?, 46 VA. L. REV. 730 (1960). 
 278. 364 U.S. 479 (1960). 
 279. Id. at 480–81. 
 280. See id. at 486–87 & n.7. B. T. Shelton refused to file the affidavit due to his 
membership in the NAACP. Id. at 483. He had originally challenged both the affidavit 
requirement and a separate Arkansas statute making it unlawful for any member of the NAACP 
to be employed by the state of Arkansas. Id. at 484 n.2. 
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and assembly.281 In Shelton, he again cited De Jonge but omitted any reference 
to assembly, referring instead to a “right of free association, a right closely 
allied to freedom of speech and a right which, like free speech, lies at the 
foundation of a free society.”282 Unlike the unanimous decisions in NAACP v. 
Alabama and Bates, the Court split 5–4 in Shelton, with Frankfurter and 
Harlan joined by Clark and Whittaker in dissent. Harlan’s dissent asserted that 
“[t]he rights of free speech and association embodied in the ‘liberty’ assured 
against state action by the Fourteenth Amendment are not absolute,” 
reiterating his endorsement of both the liberty argument and a kind of 
balancing.283  
In 1961, a year after Shelton, Justice Douglas wrote the majority opinion 
in Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP.284 The case arose in 1956, after 
Louisiana sought to enjoin the NAACP from doing business within its 
borders.285 The State asserted that the NAACP had violated two state 
statutes—the first prohibited associations from doing business in Louisiana if 
affiliated with out-of-state communist or subversive organizations, and the 
second required “benevolent” associations to disclose the names and addresses 
of all officers and members.286 The Court struck down both statutes.287 
Douglas dispensed with the first provision on vagueness grounds without 
referring to the right of association.288 Turning to the second provision, he 
wrote that “freedom of association is included in the bundle of First 
Amendment rights made applicable to the States by the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.”289 He interpreted Shelton to have emphasized 
that “any regulation must be highly selective in order to survive challenge 
under the First Amendment”290 and punctuated his opinion with several other 
references to the First Amendment.291 The four dissenting Justices in Shelton 
refused to join Douglas’s reasoning,292  
C. Red Cases and Black Cases 
The first four cases in which a majority of the Court had explicitly relied 
on the constitutional right of association (NAACP v. Alabama, Bates, Shelton, 
and Louisiana v. NAACP) all invalidated regulations aimed at the NAACP. On 
                                                                                                                 
 281. 361 U.S. at 522–23. 
 282. 364 U.S. at 486. 
 283. Id. at 497 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 284. 366 U.S. 293 (1961). 
 285. Id. at 294. 
 286. Id. at 294–95. 
 287. Id. at 297. 
 288. Id. at 295. 
 289. Id. at 296. 
 290. Id. 
 291. See id. at 296, 297.  
 292. Id. at 297. 
524 TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77:485 
 
a practical level, these decisions were crucial to the Civil Rights Movement. 
As Samuel Walker has argued, “[t]he NAACP could not have survived in the 
South, and the civil rights movement would have been set back for years, 
without the new freedom of association protections.”293 But if upholding a 
right of association for members of the NAACP sustained that organization’s 
existence, the failure to uphold that same right for members of the CPUSA 
almost certainly contributed to its demise.294  
A majority of the Court had already shown a reluctance to apply or even 
acknowledge a right of association for communists in Uphaus and Barenblatt. 
This trend intensified in 1961. In Communist Party of the United States v. 
Subversive Activities Control Board (SACB),295 the Court reviewed the 
Subversive Activities Control Act, which imposed registration and disclosure 
requirements on “subversive” organizations. Harry Kalven has suggested that 
“SACB should have been the architectonic case for freedom of association” 
because the statute at issue “aimed at sanctioning association and thus openly 
posed the issue that had been disguised as a speech problem in Dennis.”296 
Instead, in the same 5–4 split as Uphaus and Barenblatt, the Court upheld the 
entire Act.297 Justice Frankfurter wrote the lengthy majority opinion, 
distinguishing the case from NAACP v. Alabama, Bates, and Shelton based on 
“the magnitude of the public interests which the registration and disclosure 
provisions are designed to protect and . . . the pertinence which registration 
and disclosure bear to the protection of those interests.”298 Although the 
Justices split on the outcome, they all agreed that the right of association 
applied to the federal government through the First Amendment.299  
                                                                                                                 
 293. WALKER, supra note 13, at 241. NAACP membership in the South had fallen from 
128,000 in 1955 to 80,000 in 1957, and almost 250 branches had closed. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, 
FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL 
EQUALITY 383 (2004). In Louisiana, membership plummeted from 13,000 to 1,700, and in South 
Carolina it fell from 8,200 to 2,000. Id. The litigation that led to NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. 
Patterson effectively shut down the NAACP in that state from the time of the 1956 injunction 
until the case was finally resolved through additional litigation in 1964. See id. 
 294. See generally ROBERT JUSTIN GOLDSTEIN, POLITICAL REPRESSION IN MODERN 
AMERICA: FROM 1870 TO THE PRESENT 369 (1978) (“The most dramatic and easily documentable 
effect of the Truman-McCarthy period was the virtual annihilation of the Communist 
Party . . . .”). 
 295. 367 U.S. 1 (1961). 
 296. HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA 264 
(1988). Kalven contends the 212 pages of opinions by the Justices and the belief that the case 
involved legislation limited in scope to the Communist Party has led SACB to be “treated as 
outside the mainstream of First Amendment precedent.” Id. Kalven argues that despite its 
verbosity, SACB “is quite possibly the precedent which carries the greatest threat to political 
freedoms in the future” and deserves a “central place” in First Amendment case law. Id. at 265. 
 297. SACB, 367 U.S. at 115.  
 298. Id. at 93. 
 299. Justice Frankfurter titled a section of his opinion “The Freedoms of Expression and 
Association Protected by the First Amendment.” Id. at 88. He asserted that “the power of 
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On the same day that it decided SACB, the Court issued its 5–4 decision in 
Scales v. United States.300 Writing for the majority, Justice Harlan upheld the 
petitioner’s conviction under the Smith Act’s membership clause, which he 
construed as requiring proof of “active” rather than merely “passive” 
membership in the Communist Party.301 He insisted that a conviction under the 
act required the government to establish more than mere membership, “but 
active and purposive membership, purposive that is as to the organization’s 
criminal ends.”302  
All nine Justices had backed the right of association for the NAACP in 
NAACP v. Alabama, Bates, and Louisiana v. NAACP, and Justice Stewart’s 
vote ensured a similar outcome in Shelton. But in Uphaus, Barenblatt, SACB, 
and Scales, Justice Stewart joined Justices Frankfurter, Harlan, Whittaker, and 
Clark to deny these same associational protections to the CPUSA. In the words 
of ACLU legal director Mel Wulf, “[t]here were red cases and black cases.”303 
Kalven phrased it even more to the point: “The Communists cannot win, the 
NAACP cannot lose.”304  
Although there was certainly a kind of double standard at work, the 
judicial landscape was more complicated than Wulf and Kalven suggested. 
Justice Harlan’s judicial restraint and deference to government officials on 
                                                                                                                 
Congress to regulate Communist organizations [subject to foreign control] is extensive,” but that 
power was “limited by the First Amendment.” Id. at 95, 96. Justice Frankfurter concluded that 
the Act’s registration provisions were “not repugnant to the First Amendment” and that certain 
accounting provisions did not “violate[] First Amendment rights.” Id. at 103. Justice Douglas’s 
dissent noted that “[f]reedom of association is included in the bundle of First Amendment 
rights.” Id. at 171 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 354 
U.S. 449, 460 (1958)). Justice Brennan’s partial dissent, which Chief Justice Warren joined, 
referred to “the rights of freedom of advocacy and association guaranteed by the First 
Amendment.” Id. at 191 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part). Justice Black’s dissent never explicitly 
referenced a “First Amendment right of association,” but his opinion made clear that he 
accepted the First Amendment argument. See, e.g., id. at 148 (Black, J., dissenting) (“The 
freedom to advocate ideas about public matters through associations of the nature of political 
parties and societies was contemplated and protected by the First Amendment.”). Although 
SACB suggested that all nine Justices accepted the First Amendment as the source of the right of 
association’s constraint on federal action, the source of the right of association’s constraint on 
state action remained unclear. 
 300. 367 U.S. 203 (1961). The Court also issued Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 
(1961), unanimously reversing a conviction under the Smith Act’s membership clause. 
However, Noto relied exclusively on a sufficiency of the evidence analysis. Id. at 291 (“The 
only one of petitioner’s points we need consider is his attack on the sufficiency of the evidence, 
since his statutory and constitutional challenges to the conviction are disposed of by our opinion 
in Scales; and consideration of his other contentions is rendered unnecessary by the view we 
take of his evidentiary challenge.”). 
 301. Scales, 367 U.S. at 222. 
 302. Id. at 209. 
 303. WALKER, supra note 13, at 240. Walker identifies the Court’s treatment of the 
NAACP and CPUSA as a “double standard for political groups.” Id.  
 304. KALVEN, supra note 296, at 259. 
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national security matters made him less than eager to join the Warren Court’s 
curtailment of government inquiries in the name of civil liberties.305 NAACP v. 
Alabama had been an easy case for Harlan because he believed that Alabama 
had not shown a legitimate interest in obtaining the NAACP’s membership 
list.306 Bates differed from NAACP v. Alabama in that regard, and the Court’s 
analysis required a balancing of interests.307 Although the Court’s final 
decision was unanimous, Harlan had originally drafted a dissent.308 According 
to Justice Brennan’s conference notes for Bates, Harlan believed that while 
“[t]here can be little doubt that much of the associational information called 
for by the statute will be of little or no use whatever to the school authorities,” 
he could “not understand how those authorities can be expected to fix in 
advance the terms of their inquiry so that it will yield only relevant 
information.”309 Shelton had been an even closer case than Bates,310 and the 
Court’s decision hinged on Justice Stewart’s vote. The four dissenters—
Frankfurter, Harlan, Whittaker, and Clark—believed that the government had 
shown a rational relationship between its articulated interest and the nature of 
the regulation.311 And although Stewart upheld the right of association in 
Shelton, his position in the communist cases left open the possibility that a 
better articulated governmental interest could prevail over the right of 
association in a case involving the NAACP.  
D. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee 
The Court’s dismissive treatment of communists meant that a case 
connecting the NAACP to communism “was every segregationist’s dream” 
and “offer[ed] the South the chance to take out the NAACP by painting the 
organization red.”312 That case, Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation 
Committee,313 began in 1956 when the Florida legislature began an 
investigation of alleged communist influence on the NAACP. As part of its 
inquiry, the legislative investigation committee subpoenaed the membership 
                                                                                                                 
 305. See YARBROUGH, supra note 103, at 339.  
 306. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 354 U.S. 449, 463–65 (1958). 
 307. See Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524–27 (1960). 
 308. See YARBROUGH, supra note 103, at 212. 
 309. William Brennan, Notes from the Conference, Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 
516 (1960) (William J. Brennan, Jr. Papers, Box 407, Manuscript Div., Library of Congress, 
Washington, D.C. [hereinafter Brennan Papers]), quoted in YARBROUGH, supra note 103, at 212. 
 310. The Court noted that Bates involved “no substantially relevant correlation between the 
governmental interest asserted and the State’s effort to compel disclosure of the membership list 
involved.” Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485 (1960). Shelton presented a more difficult issue 
for the Court because “there [was] no question of the relevance of a State’s inquiry into the 
fitness and competence of its teachers.” Id.  
 311. See id. at 494–96 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); id. at 497–98 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 312. POWE, supra note 37, at 155. 
 313. 372 U.S. 539, 540 (1963). 
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list of the NAACP’s Miami branch.314 Theodore Gibson, the custodian of the 
list, refused to produce it, asserting that doing so would violate the 
associational rights of NAACP members.315 The committee cited Gibson for 
contempt, and he was fined $1,200 and sentenced to six months’ 
imprisonment.316 The Florida Supreme Court upheld his conviction, and 
Gibson appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.317  
At the conference following oral argument, Chief Justice Warren protested 
that affirming Gibson would mean overruling NAACP v. Alabama because 
“even under [the] balancing theory, [the] state ha[d] shown no adequate 
interest.”318 But Justice Harlan viewed the investigation as “a bona fide inquiry 
into Communism” rather than “a plot to destroy [the] NAACP.”319 The 
Justices voted in conference to uphold the conviction, and it appeared that the 
government’s national security interests would prevail over the NAACP’s 
right of association.320 Frankfurter, the senior Justice in the majority, assigned 
the opinion to Harlan.321  
Five months later, before Harlan circulated a draft of his opinion, Justice 
Whittaker retired from the Court.322 The case, now deadlocked at 4–4, was 
held over for reargument.323 Then Frankfurter suffered a stroke and left the 
Court. When Gibson was reargued the following term, Byron White had 
replaced Whittaker and Arthur Goldberg had succeeded Frankfurter. Justice 
Goldberg provided the fifth vote for the NAACP. He authored the majority 
opinion, distinguishing the case from earlier legislative investigation cases on 
the basis that Gibson had not been asked about his own associations with the 
Communist Party.324 Samuel Walker suggests that this result “was the clearest 
                                                                                                                 
 314. Id.  
 315. Id. at 542–43. Gibson instead offered to testify according to his personal knowledge. 
Id. at 543. After the committee presented him with the names and pictures of fourteen 
individuals with suspected communist affiliations, Gibson testified that none were NAACP 
members. Id. 
 316. Id. 
 317. Id.  
 318. William Brennan, Notes from the Conference, Gibson v. Florida Legislative 
Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963) (Brennan Papers, Box 409), quoted in YARBROUGH, 
supra note 103, at 210. 
 319. Id. 
 320. POWE, supra note 37, at 155. 
 321. YARBROUGH, supra note 103, at 210 . 
 322. See POWE, supra note 37, at 156.  
 323. Id. 
 324. Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 547–48 (1963). Powe 
writes that Justice Goldberg was “looking for a way to protect the NAACP without having to 
overrule all the legislative-investigation cases.” POWE, supra note 37, at 221. Justice Harlan’s 
dissent argued that the Court’s decision forced the Florida legislative committee “to prove in 
advance the very things it [wa]s trying to find out.” Gibson, 372 U.S. at 580 (Harlan, J., 
dissenting). 
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indication of the extent to which the Court granted to the NAACP the 
protections it had refused to extend to the Communists.”325  
Justices Black and Douglas wrote separate concurrences. In Black’s view, 
“the constitutional right of association includes the privilege of any person to 
associate with Communists or anti-Communists, Socialists or anti-Socialists, 
or, for that matter, with people of all kinds of beliefs, popular or unpopular.”326 
Douglas’s concurrence read more like a college essay than a legal opinion.327 
He quoted or cited eight law review articles (including one written by Justice 
Brennan), Yale President A. Whitney Griswold’s 1958 baccalaureate address, 
Edwin Corwin’s The Constitution and What it Means Today, Hannah Arendt’s 
On Revolution, various works and personal letters of Thomas Jefferson, Arthur 
Schlesinger’s The Rise of the City, James Madison’s Federalist No. 51, Robert 
Bolt’s play A Man for All Seasons, and George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-
Four.328  
Douglas’s Gibson concurrence posited three distinct possibilities for the 
constitutional source of association. First advancing the incorporation 
argument, he recognized “the authority of a State to investigate people, their 
ideas, their activities” and asserted that “[b]y virtue of the Fourteenth 
Amendment the State is now subject to the same restrictions in making the 
investigation as the First Amendment places on the Federal Government.”329 
Taking direct aim at Justice Harlan, Douglas stated in a footnote: 
 Some have believed that these restraints as applied to the States through 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment are less restrictive on 
them than they are on the Federal Government. That is the view of my 
Brother Harlan. . . . But that view has not prevailed. The Court has indeed 
applied the same First Amendment requirements to the States as to the 
Federal Government.330  
He then hinted at the assembly argument with a lengthy tribute to the right 
of assembly: 
                                                                                                                 
 325. WALKER, supra note 13, at 241. The Court acknowledged its attenuated application of 
the right of association in communist cases in Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 
(1967). Justice Clark’s dissent, joined by Justices Harlan, Stewart, and White, lamented that “the 
majority has, by its broadside swept away one of our most precious rights, namely, the right of 
self-preservation.” Id. at 628 (Clark, J., dissenting).  
 326. Gibson, 372 U.S. at 559 (Black, J., concurring). 
 327. Justice Douglas, who had a propensity for writing his opinions quickly, may have 
drafted his concurrence as a dissent before the case was held over, and Justice Goldberg’s 
replacement of Justice Frankfurter reversed the outcome. Cf. L.A. Powe, Jr., Justice Douglas 
After Fifty Years: The First Amendment, McCarthyism and Rights, 6 CONST. COMMENT. 267, 
271 (1989) (“[Douglas] wrote his dissents before the author of the majority had put pen to 
paper.”). 
 328. Gibson, 372 U.S. at 559 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 329. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 330. Id. at 560 n.2 (citations omitted). 
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 Joining a lawful organization, like attending a church, is an associational 
activity that comes within the purview of the First Amendment, which 
provides in relevant part: “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people, peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.” 
“Peaceably to assemble” as used in the First Amendment necessarily 
involves a coming together, whether regularly or spasmodically. Historically 
the right to assemble was secondary to the right to petition, the latter being 
the primary right. But today, as the Court stated in De Jonge v. Oregon, “The 
right of peaceable assembly is a right cognate to those of free speech and free 
press and is equally fundamental.” Assembly, like speech, is indeed essential 
“in order to maintain the opportunity for free political discussion, to the end 
that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that 
changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful means.” “The holding of 
meetings for peaceable political action cannot be proscribed. A Free Society 
is made up of almost innumerable institutions through which views and 
opinions are expressed, opinion is mobilized, and social, economic, religious, 
educational, and political programs are formulated.331  
Finally, Douglas revisited the “bundle of rights” language that had 
appeared in his Louisiana v. NAACP majority opinion332 and his Communist 
Party of the United States v. SACB dissent.333 He connected this bundle to a 
“right of privacy”: 
 The right of association has become a part of the bundle of rights 
protected by the First Amendment, and the need for a pervasive right of 
privacy against government intrusion has been recognized, though not always 
given the recognition it deserves. Unpopular groups like popular ones are 
protected. Unpopular groups if forced to disclose their membership lists may 
suffer reprisals or other forms of public hostility. But whether a group is 
popular or unpopular, the right of privacy implicit in the First Amendment 
creates an area into which the Government may not enter.334  
According to Douglas, then, not only was the right of association somehow 
derivative of the First Amendment right of assembly, it was also “part of the 
bundle of rights protected by the First Amendment” and related to “the right of 
privacy implicit in the First Amendment.”335  
                                                                                                                 
 331. Id. at 562–63 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 332. See 366 U.S. 293, 296 (1961) (“We deal with a constitutional right, since freedom of 
association is included in the bundle of First Amendment rights made applicable to the States by 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 333. See 367 U.S. 1, 171 (1960) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“Freedom of association is 
included in the bundle of First Amendment rights.”). 
 334. Gibson, 372 U.S. at 569–70 (citations and footnote omitted). 
 335. Justice Douglas reiterated his arguments for association (some of which were taken 
verbatim from his Gibson concurrence) in a lecture that he delivered at Brown University that 
was published subsequently in the Columbia Law Review. See William O. Douglas, The Right of 
530 TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77:485 
 
E. Confusion in the Academy 
The new right of association first announced in NAACP v. Alabama 
produced a stream of historical and doctrinal analyses. Book-length treatments 
included Glenn Abernathy’s The Right of Assembly and Association,336 
Charles Rice’s Freedom of Association,337 and David Fellman’s The 
Constitutional Right of Association.338 These works attempted to narrate a 
history of association that had been absent from nearly two centuries of 
American constitutional law. Fellman, for example, suggested that “however 
ill-defined they may be, the rights of association have a definite place in 
American constitutional law.”339 Rice argued that “[t]he right to associate for 
the advancement of ideas ha[d] been recognized implicitly in the past, and it 
ha[d] underlain important decisions which ha[d] been formally ascribed to the 
application of other freedoms.”340 Carl Beck’s Contempt of Congress took the 
most creative route, referring to a nonexistent “freedom of political affiliation 
clause[] of the First Amendment.”341 
Abernathy provided the most comprehensive account of association. He 
had first speculated about a right of association in a 1953 article published in 
the South Carolina Law Quarterly.342 Quoting extensively from Alexis de 
Tocqueville and Arthur Schlesinger, Abernathy suggested that the “importance 
[of freedom of association] in a democratic society cannot be 
overestimated.”343 Noting that the Supreme Court had, at that time, yet to 
recognize a right of association,344 he argued that it was nonetheless “a right 
cognate to those of free speech and free assembly.”345 Abernathy expressed 
concern that Congress’s anti-communist legislation and the Court’s Adler 
                                                                                                                 
Association, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1361 (1963). Justice Harlan’s dissent in Gibson, which was 
joined by Justices Clark, Stewart, and White, ignored Douglas’s attacks on the liberty argument 
for association. See 372 U.S. at 376 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Because Gibson had been willing to 
testify from memory about individual members and because the committee had sought the 
membership records, which would have been known only to him, for the limited purpose of 
refreshing Gibson’s own recollection, Harlan “[found] it difficult to see how this case really 
present[ed] any serious question as to interference with freedom of association.” Id. at 582 
(Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 336. GLENN ABERNATHY, THE RIGHT OF ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION (1961). 
 337. CHARLES E. RICE, FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION (1962). 
 338. DAVID FELLMAN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION (1963). 
 339. Id. at 1–2. 
 340. RICE, supra note 337, at xvii–xviii. 
 341. BECK, supra note 9, at viii. Beck is not alone in making such a claim. “[A]t least 
twenty-five federal district and appellate court opinions have referred to a nonexistent ‘freedom 
of association clause’ in the United States Constitution.” See Inazu, supra note 3, at 568 & n.11 
(collecting cases). 
 342. Glenn Abernathy, The Right of Association, 6 S.C.L.Q. 32 (1953). 
 343. Id. at 33. 
 344. Id. at 34. 
 345. Id. at 33, 75. 
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decision hindered Americans from joining all but the most “ultra-acceptable” 
associations.346 He decried “shotgun legislation which endangers the whole 
institution of voluntary association” and argued for a “broad freedom to 
associate.”347 But Abernathy’s principal concern for free association had little 
to do with protecting unpopular or dissenting groups. Rather, his instrumental 
view of association contended:  
[Associations] serve as a training ground for group participation, 
organization and management of people and programs, and for democratic 
acceptance of the majority will. They can also serve as a potential influence 
for improvement of communication between the individual and the 
government. Concerted demands for action by associations of people have a 
better chance for accomplishing the desired governmental action than do 
scattered individual requests. And the information furnished to administrators 
and legislators by private associations of various kinds is in many instances 
vital to the intelligent treatment of particular problems.348  
From this perspective, Abernathy concluded that “political parties are our most 
important associations.”349  
Abernathy’s book-length treatment eight years later underscored the 
themes of his article: 
[E]xperience in various associations is virtually a guarantee of respect for the 
majority view. It does not necessarily lead to complete acceptance of the 
majority will, but it does lead usually to a sufficient respect for that will to 
enable the group to act in concert once a decision has been made. This 
acquiescence in the decisions of the majority, based in large part on 
experience in associations of various types, is an important explanation of the 
fact that Americans can close ranks and function as a strongly united nation 
after an election which is preceded by almost violent contests between the 
two major political parties.350 
This characterization contained two implicit assumptions. The first was that a 
kind of bounded consensus across groups ensured stability in the midst of 
disagreement. The second was that the internal practices of associations 
mirrored democratic practices in which majority will prevails. Neither of these 
assumptions is inherent in the nature of groups, but both were consistent with 
                                                                                                                 
 346. Id. at 72. 
 347. Id. at 77. 
 348. Id. at 75–76. These comments also reflected Alexis de Tocqueville’s pluralist 
interpretation that emphasized the Frenchman’s comments on the educational value of 
association. Cf. Aviam Soifer, “Toward a Generalized Notion of the Right to Form or Join an 
Association”: An Essay for Tom Emerson, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 641, 651 & n.33 (1988) 
(suggesting Tocqueville emphasized that “associations help teach us how to define ourselves as 
individuals”). 
 349. Abernathy, supra note 342, at 76. 
 350. ABERNATHY, supra note 336, at 240. 
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the pluralist political thought of the time (which is addressed in the next 
section).  
Abernathy intimated that NAACP v. Alabama had relied on the assembly 
argument. He argued that the decision had placed the right of association 
within an “expanded meaning” of the right of assembly,351 and that association 
was “clearly a right cognate to the right of assembly.”352 The right of assembly 
“need not be artificially narrowed to encompass only the physical assemblage 
in a park or meeting hall. It can justifiably be extended to include as well those 
persons who are joined together through organizational affiliation.”353  
Abernathy also noted a constraint inherent in the Court’s articulation of 
the right of association: 
 It must be noted that [NAACP v. Alabama] does not clearly extend the 
First Amendment protection to all lawful affiliations or organizations. What 
Justice Harlan discusses is the association “for the advancement of beliefs 
and ideas.” Clearly a vast number of existing associations would fall within 
this description, but it is questionable whether the characterization would fit 
the purely social club, the garden club, or perhaps even some kinds of trade 
or professional unions. No such distinction has been drawn in the cases 
squarely involving freedom of assembly questions. The latter cases 
emphasize that the right extends to any lawful assembly, without a specific 
requirement that there be an intention to advance beliefs and ideas.354 
In observing this limitation in scope, Abernathy detected an important 
distinction in Justice Harlan’s opinion between the right of assembly and the 
right of association. He quickly brushed it aside, asserting that “[t]he practical 
effect, of course, may be unimportant, since fairly obviously the Court would 
be inclined to scrutinize restrictions on social clubs less closely than those on 
organizations identifying themselves more intimately with the political 
process.”355 But the real danger is greater than Abernathy surmised—it 
becomes apparent when we consider who decides whether an organization 
exists “for the advancement of beliefs or ideas” or is involved “intimately with 
the political process.” As a practical matter, these kind of legal distinctions are 
always made by some representative of government, which means that the 
right of association’s protections are limited by the subjective political 
judgment of those who exercise coercive power. And, as Abernathy noted, this 
limitation is absent in the right of assembly.356  
                                                                                                                 
 351. Id. at 4. 
 352. Id. at 173; see also id. at 252 (“With the increasing emphasis on the right of 
association as a cognate to the right of assembly, it appears that this least-discussed of the First 
Amendment rights is at last acquiring an independent status.”). 
 353. Id. at 173. 
 354. Id. at 236–37. 
 355. Id. at 237. 
 356. Id. The right of peaceable assembly, of course, draws its own lines by limiting its 
protections to groups that do not pose a threat of imminent harm to the state. That judgment is 
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It is not entirely surprising that the early scholarly treatment of the right of 
association reflected the Court’s own lack of clarity. Writing in 1964, Thomas 
Emerson observed that “the constitutional source of ‘the right of association,’ 
the principles which underlie it, the extent of its reach, and the standards by 
which it is to be applied have never been clearly set forth.”357 He further 
observed that “the various justices have differed among themselves on all 
these matters.”358 Emerson warned that “a general ‘right of association’ does 
not carry us very far in the solution of concrete issues” and “current problems 
involving associational rights must be framed and answered in terms of more 
traditional constitutional doctrines.”359 But the right of association was, in 
large part, a right without a constitutional history. Its contours were more 
likely to be shaped by the intellectual context in which it emerged.  
V. PLURALIST POLITICAL THEORY 
I have addressed above two factors that contributed to the constitutional 
framework for the right of association: (1) a political factor (the conflation of 
anti-communist sentiment and the rise of the Civil Rights Movement); and (2) 
a jurisprudential factor (the infighting on the Court over the proper way to 
ground the right of association and the relationship between association and 
assembly). I turn now to a theoretical factor: the pluralist political theory of 
the mid-twentieth century. Pluralist assumptions exacerbated the political and 
jurisprudential factors affecting the right of association and helped that right 
gain traction in legal and political discourse.  
The pluralist tradition that began in the early twentieth century changed 
the way American political theorists conceived of the relationship between 
groups and the state.360 But unlike some of its British antecedents, American 
pluralism replaced the narrative of state theory with an equally dogmatic claim 
that politics relocated among groups achieved a harmonious balance within a 
broad consensus that supported American democracy. The balance assumption 
sprang from the pluralist need to attribute the relative stability in democratic 
society to something other than centralized state power.361 The consensus 
assumption perpetuated an exaggerated claim of homogeneity in American 
history and political culture that downplayed fundamental differences between 
                                                                                                                 
also a subjective and political one made by the state. But it is no less present in the right of 
association. 
 357. Emerson, supra note 220, at 2. 
 358. Id. 
 359. Id. at 3. 
 360. See John G. Gunnell, The Genealogy of American Pluralism: From Madison to 
Behavioralism, 17 INT. POL. SCI. REV. 253, 254 (1996) (“The recession of the traditional theory 
of the state raised questions about the nature of democracy, and it was accompanied by a 
growing, if often critical, focus on groups and group interests as the moving forces in politics.”) 
[hereinafter Gunnell, Genealogy].  
 361. See infra Part V.A. 
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groups.362 As the following discussion will reveal, these two assumptions were 
present in early American pluralists like Arthur Bentley and became even 
more pronounced in postwar pluralists like David Truman and Robert Dahl.  
Truman and Dahl invoked familiar authorities to support their assumptions 
of balance and consensus: Tocqueville’s Democracy in America and 
Madison’s Federalist No. 10.363 But their interpretive efforts misread Madison 
and decontextualized Tocqueville. They converted Madison’s negative 
“faction” into an inherently valuable and implicitly benign “interest.”364 And 
they applied Tocqueville’s observations of a homogenous segment of the 
population in preindustrial America to the diverse interests existing in an 
increasingly fractured industrial society.365 Perhaps most ironically, pluralist 
adaptations of Madison and Tocqueville jettisoned both theorists’ warnings 
about the tyranny of the majority.366 Because pluralist thinkers presupposed 
that associational autonomy conformed to what they perceived as basic 
conceptions of democracy, they were blind to the very majoritarian dangers 
against which Madison and Tocqueville had warned. These pluralist views—
and their consequences—set the theoretical context for the constitutional right 
of association that emerged in the 1950s and 1960s.  
A. Power, Balance, and Stability 
Early pluralists challenged the modern state’s claim to complete 
sovereignty, an idea that had gained prominence in German idealism and 
entered American political thought through Francis Lieber.367 While Lieber 
and others had located the locus of power in the state, pluralists looked instead 
at the various groups that comprised society.368 The pluralist argument ran 
contrary not only to the tenets of German idealism369 but also to those of 
classical liberalism, which in its own way assumed the primacy of the state.370 
                                                                                                                 
 362. See infra Part V.B.  
 363. See infra Part V.C. 
 364. See infra text accompanying notes 466–483. 
 365. See infra text accompanying notes 484–507. 
 366. See infra Part VI.  
 367. Gunnell, Genealogy, supra note 360. For a more detailed account of Lieber’s role in 
the development of American political theory, see JOHN GUNNELL, THE DESCENT OF POLITICAL 
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 370. This is evident not only in Hobbes’s Leviathan but also in Locke’s more familiar 
liberal thought. For example, even while Locke discusses a freedom of religious association in 
his Letter On Toleration, he makes clear that when minority practices collide with majority will, 
the latter prevails. JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER ON TOLERATION 131 (Raymond Klibanksy, ed., J. W. 
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As these pluralist ideas gained traction, the state-centered theory “began to 
lose ground as an account of political reality.”371 But pluralists were not 
anarchists, and without Leviathan they needed something else to account for 
the relative peace that they observed in American society. They concluded that 
in the absence of state coercion (which they downplayed), stability came from 
the balancing of interests and power among the various groups that comprised 
the political life of society.372  
The pluralist view of balanced power began with Arthur Bentley’s The 
Process of Government,373 which also provided one of the earliest systematic 
attempts to challenge state-centered theory.374 Bentley’s “group basis of 
politics”375 focused on interests expressed through group activity.376 He 
described “the push and resistance between groups” as “pressure” and 
suggested that “[t]he balance of the group pressures is the existing state of 
society.”377 For Bentley, groups formed the fundamental ontology of politics: 
“When the groups are adequately stated, everything is stated.”378  
Despite its frontal attack on the notion of state sovereignty, The Process of 
Government received scant attention in its first printing in 1908.379 It would, in 
fact, take a generation before political scientists embraced it for its theory and 
methodology.380 In the intervening years, the monist account of state 
sovereignty that Bentley challenged suffered a further setback when German 
idealism fell out of favor after the First World War.381 The alternative theory 
of politics that emerged in American political thought during this period 
arrived through the British pluralist Harold Laski.382  
                                                                                                                 
Gough, trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1968) (1689) (“no doctrines incompatible with human 
society, and contrary to the good morals which are necessary for the preservation of civil 
society, are to be tolerated by the magistrate.”). 
 371. Gunnell, Genealogy, supra note 360, at 256.  
 372. See infra notes 374–427 and accompanying text.  
 373. ARTHUR BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT (Peter H. Odegard, ed., Harvard 
Univ. Press 1967) (1908). Some strands of pluralism also draw from work by the American 
pragmatists William James and John Dewey. See AVIGAIL I. EISENBERG, RECONSTRUCTING 
POLITICAL PLURALISM 27–53 (1995) (discussing the pluralism of James and Dewey). 
 374. Gunnell, Genealogy, supra note 360, at 256. 
 375. BENTLEY, supra note 373, at xxxiv. 
 376. Id. at 258.  
 377. Id. at 258–59. Bentley does not develop the concept of “balance” to the degree of later 
pluralists. He describes law as “the pressures being assumed to have worked themselves through 
to a conclusion or balance” but notes that “the pressures never do as a matter of fact work 
themselves through to a final balance, and law, stated as a completed balance, is therefore highly 
abstract.” Id. at 299. 
 378. Id. at 208 
 379. Gunnell, Genealogy, supra note 360, at 256 (discussing The Process of Government: 
“[It] had minimal direct and immediate impact on the discourse of political science.”).  
 380. Id. at 256–57. 
 381. Id. at 254. 
 382. See id. Laski drew from other British pluralists including John Figgis and Frederic 
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Laski and other British pluralists challenged the assumption that individual 
loyalties within a community lay solely with the state.383 In Herbert Deane’s 
words, Laski’s early political writings were a “constant polemic” against “the 
conception that the state is to political theory what the Absolute is to 
metaphysics, that it is mysteriously One above all other human groupings, and 
that, because of its superior position and higher purpose, it is entitled to the 
undivided allegiance of each of its citizens.”384 
Laski also attacked legal positivists like Jeremy Bentham and John 
Austin,385 who maintained that the state was sovereign and that law itself was 
nothing more than the sovereign’s command.386 Laski asserted that “the state is 
only one among many forms of human associations,”387 and advocated a 
functional decentralization of power in which individuals increasingly turned 
to private groups to meet their interests and needs.388 He believed the transfer 
of governmental functions to private entities divided political power.389 In John 
Gunnell’s characterization, Laski “turned to pluralism as both a ‘realistic’ 
account of politics and as the basis of a new democratic theory.”390  
For Laski and the other British pluralists, the relationship between groups 
and the state was as polarized as it was metaphysical.391 But in the United 
States, a more blunted strand of pluralism gained influence in the 1930s 
through the circulation of “mutually reinforcing empirical studies of group 
activity and accounts of the new image of democracy which were contrasted 
with totalitarianism.”392 By the end of the 1930s, “liberalism in political 
                                                                                                                 
Maitland. HERBERT A. DEANE, THE POLITICAL IDEAS OF HAROLD J. LASKI 17, 25–27 (Archon 
Books 1972) (1955). 
 383. See Earl Latham, The Group Basis of Politics: Notes for a Theory, 46 AMER. POL. SCI. 
REV. 376, 379 (1952). 
 384. DEANE, supra note 382, at 13. 
 385. See id. at 14–15. 
 386. See id.; see also EISENBERG, supra note 373, at 76–77. 
 387. HAROLD LASKI, AUTHORITY IN THE MODERN STATE 65 (Yale Univ. Press 1919).  
 388. See id. at 75–81, 384–85. Laski’s theory posited “a series of coordinate groups the 
purpose of which may well be antithetic [to one another].” Id. at 84.  
 389. See id.; see also DEANE, supra note 382, at 30–31. Herbert Deane writes that Laski’s 
distrust of consolidated political power led him to desire “to see power split up, divided, set 
against itself, and thrown widespread among men by various devices of decentralization.” Id. at 
17; cf. GRANT MCCONNELL, PRIVATE POWER AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 119 (1966) (“[T]he 
private association . . . has been linked with the values of decentralization and federalism. It has 
also been pictured as the source of stability in politics and held up as the medium of the public 
interest.”). 
 390. Gunnell, Genealogy, supra note 360, at 257. 
 391. See id.  
 392. Id. at 260. Other important works building on Laski’s pluralist concepts included A 
HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORIES: RECENT TIMES (Charles Meriam and Henry Elmer Barnes 
eds., The MacMillan Co. 1935) and PENDLETON HERRING, GROUP REPRESENTATION BEFORE 
CONGRESS (Russell & Russell 1967) (1929). Deane writes that by the early 1930s, Laski found 
“the essence of the state to be its power to enforce its norms upon all who live within its 
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science largely meant pluralism, and pluralism was both a descriptive and a 
normative thesis.”393 According to Gunnell, Pendleton Herring’s 1940 book 
The Politics of Democracy, “claimed that along with party integration and 
governmental accountability, political rationality was to be found in the 
conflict and adjustment between interest groups.”394 This meant that 
“[d]emocracy was not a matter of theology and creeds, but the practice of 
tolerance and compromise.”395  
The pluralist notion of balance extended to economic descriptions with 
John Kenneth Galbraith’s ideas of “countervailing power.”396 Meanwhile, 
David Riesman argued that power was distributed among “veto groups” that 
displayed a “necessary mutual tolerance” and “mirror[ed] each other in their 
style of political action, including their interest in public relations and their 
emphasis on internal harmony of feelings.”397 Godfrey Hodgson recalled the 
fusion of balance and stability that permeated the pluralist era with his 
observation that “‘the businessman and the unskilled laborer, the writer and 
the housewife, Harvard University and the Strategic Air Command, 
International Business Machines and the labor movement, all had their parts to 
play in one harmonious political, intellectual, and economic system.’”398  
David Truman’s The Governmental Process described “the vast 
multiplication of interests and organized groups in recent decades”399 whose 
activities “imply controversy and conflict, the essence of politics.”400 Truman 
asserted that “the behaviors that constitute the process of government cannot 
be adequately understood apart from the groups.”401 For Truman, these 
interests held each other in equilibrium: multiple memberships in “potential 
groups” collectively formed a “balance wheel” in politics.402 Truman argued 
that “[w]ithout the notion of multiple memberships in potential groups it is 
literally impossible to account for the existence of a viable polity such as that 
in the United States or to develop a coherent conception of the political 
process.”403 
                                                                                                                 
boundaries and its supremacy over all other forms of social grouping.” DEANE, supra note 382, 
at 84.  
 393. GUNNELL, DESCENT, supra note 367, at 204. 
 394. Gunnell, Genealogy, supra note 360, at 259. 
 395. Id. 
 396. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM 118 (1952). 
 397. DAVID RIESMAN, THE LONELY CROWD 215 (Yale Univ. Press, abr. ed. 1976).  
 398. STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM PREMODERNISM TO 
POSTMODERNISM 119 (2000) (quoting GODFREY HODGSON, AMERICA IN OUR TIME (1976)).  
 399. DAVID BICKNELL TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS: POLITICAL INTERESTS AND 
PUBLIC OPINION 502 (2nd ed. 1971). 
 400. Id. at 502–03.  
 401. Id. at 502. 
 402. Id. at 514. 
 403. Id. 
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The most important theorist of postwar pluralism was Robert Dahl.404 
Although Dahl drew upon early pluralists like Laski,405 his outlook was 
defined by the “‘behavioral approach’” that manifested “‘a strong sense of 
dissatisfaction with the achievements of conventional political science, 
particularly through historical, philosophical, and the descriptive-institutional 
approaches.’”406 Under Dahl’s influence, “[t]he mid-1960s marked the 
apotheosis of pluralism as the substance of the vision of both domestic and 
comparative politics accepted by behavioralism, and it was embedded in most 
of the conceptual schemes for political analysis.”407 Over time, Dahl muted 
some of his more strident assertions, but his initial claims shaped a generation 
of political science scholarship.408  
Dahl sought to provide an account of how power was exercised in political 
decision-making.409 He started with the premise that the United States was a 
“mixture of elite rule and democracy,”410 or a “polyarchy.”411 Against the 
“ruling-elite model” advanced by sociologists like C. Wright Mills,412 Dahl 
argued that power was diffused among a wide diversity of groups.413 In other 
words, Dahl believed that democracy was a “government by minorities.”414 
Avigail Eisenberg explains the conclusions that flow from this premise: 
The direction that public policy follows depends on the nature of the 
coalition of minorities that dominates the policy-making scene at any given 
                                                                                                                 
 404. See EISENBERG, supra note 373, at 139 (“Dahl’s theory contains the clearest and most 
comprehensive treatment of postwar pluralism.”); cf. GUNNELL, DESCENT, supra note 367, at 241 
(“Few would suggest that Dahl’s descriptive study of New Haven’s politics, published the same 
year as his essay on the behavioral approach, was less than an implicit endorsement of pluralism 
as a normative theory of liberal democracy.”).  
 405. See EISENBERG, supra note 373, at 96; see also ROBERT DAHL, DEMOCRACY, LIBERTY, 
AND EQUALITY 281–82 n.11 (1986). 
 406. GUNNELL, DESCENT, supra note 367, at 221–22 (quoting Robert Dahl, The Behavioral 
Approach in Political Science: An Epitaph for a Monument to a Successful Protest, 55 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 763, 763–72).  
 407. GUNNELL, DESCENT, supra note 367, at 265. 
 408. Richard Merelman suggests that Dahl’s 1956 A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY and 
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IN AMERICA 17 (2003). Merelman observes that the claims that Dahl considers as “settled” in the 
former are “up for grabs” in the latter. Id. at 18. 
 409. Gunnell, Genealogy, supra note 360, at 260–61. 
 410. ROBERT DAHL, DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES: PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE 35 
(2nd ed. 1972) [hereinafter DAHL, PROMISE]. 
 411. Id.  
 412. See id.; see generally C. WRIGHT MILLS, THE POWER ELITE (1956) (study of the 
structure and distribution of power in the United States).  
 413. See ROBERT DAHL, PLURALIST DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES: CONFLICT AND 
CONSENT 23 (1967) [hereinafter DAHL, CONFLICT]. 
 414. ROBERT DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 133 (1956) (italics omitted) 
[hereinafter DAHL, PREFACE].  
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instant. The groups’ reliance on each other creates an informal system of 
checks and balances in which no group is able to dominate the others. There 
is no chance for a minority to dominate a coalition because other minorities 
within the coalition will defect. Similarly, majorities are unable to pose a 
threat, since they are comprised of small groups, any of which may defect 
from the coalition if the policy direction changes.415  
Paradoxically, the lack of widespread agreement produced stability and 
prevented discord. For Dahl, the American political system was “a relatively 
efficient system for reinforcing agreement, encouraging moderation, and 
maintaining social peace.”416 
Dahl’s most explicit endorsement of pluralism is found in his 1967 text, 
Pluralist Democracy in the United States: Conflict and Consent.417 He 
believed that “multiple centers of power, none of which is or can be wholly 
sovereign” were “[t]he fundamental axiom in the theory and practise of 
American pluralism.”418 Under this premise, “[b]ecause one center of power is 
set against another, power itself will be tamed, civilized, controlled, and 
limited to decent human purposes, while coercion, the most evil form of 
power, will be reduced to a minimum.”419  
Dahl recognized that in polyarchies, “a great many questions of policy are 
placed in the hands of private, semipublic, and local governmental 
organizations such as churches, families, business firms, trade unions, towns, 
cities, provinces, and the like.”420 But he left unspecified criteria for evaluating 
whether an entity was “private” or “semipublic.”421 Further, Dahl seemed 
                                                                                                                 
 415. EISENBERG, supra note 373, at 141. 
 416. DAHL, PREFACE, supra note 414, at 151. Eisenberg suggests that stability became the 
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373, at 158. 
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 418. DAHL, CONFLICT, supra note 413, at 24. 
 419. Id. 
 420. DAHL, PROMISE, supra note 410, at 41–42.  
 421. Id. 
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overly sanguine in his assessment that “whenever a group of people believe 
that they are adversely affected by national policies or are about to be, they 
generally have extensive opportunities for presenting their case and for 
negotiations that may produce a more acceptable alternative.”422 Like earlier 
pluralists, he generally failed to account for the kinds of public power now 
dissipated among private groups. For example, he contended that most conflict 
between groups would be resolved not by coercion but by “peaceful 
adjustment.”423  
Some of Dahl’s claims about the “extensive opportunities” for 
negotiations and prospects for “peaceful adjustment” seemed terribly at odds 
with events unfolding in American society at that time, like civil rights sit-ins, 
campus activism, and protests against the Vietnam War. John Gunnell 
attributes this disconnect to the behavioralism popularized by Dahl: “At the 
very historical moment that events such as [these] were taking place, political 
science research seemed to ignore these matters in favor of the study of such 
things as voting.”424 Further, the pluralist narrative, that power dispersed 
among groups led to a balanced equilibrium, resonated with the rhetoric of 
objectivity that had entered the discipline of political science.425 Pluralists, like 
some of their quantitative successors in contemporary political science, 
believed that by identifying the proper data and methodology, politics could be 
reduced to a system of solvable equations.426 Because equations could be 
balanced and followed logical patterns, then so must the forms of power that 
pluralists observed in groups.427  
                                                                                                                 
 422. Id. at 42.  
 423. ROBERT DAHL, MODERN POLITICAL ANALYSIS 73 (1963). 
 424. GUNNELL, DESCENT, supra note 367, at 263; cf. id. at 106 (the controversy about “state 
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2010] THE STRANGE ORIGINS OF THE RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION 541 
 
B. The Pluralist Consensus 
Even more pronounced than the pluralist gloss on balance was its assumed 
consensus of democratic beliefs and values. The beginnings of this consensus 
narrative emerged in the era of industrialization.428 The economic focus of 
progressive reforms of the early twentieth century had led to “a belief in the 
capacity of American abundance to smooth over questions of class and power 
by creating a nation of consumers.”429 In Alan Brinkley’s assessment, liberal 
reformers were confident “that their new consumer-oriented approach to 
political economy had freed them at last from the need to reform capitalist 
institutions and from the pressure to redistribute wealth and economic 
power.”430  
The pluralist consensus can be traced to Arthur Bentley, who asserted that 
all struggles between groups proceeded within a “habit background.”431 
Bentley believed there were “rules of the game” that formed “the background 
of the group activity.”432 These constraints limit “the technique of the struggle” 
employed by groups.433 Because of these limits, “when the struggle proceeds 
too harshly at any point there will become insistent in the society a group more 
powerful than either of those involved which tends to suppress the extreme 
and annoying methods of the groups in the primary struggle.”434 These 
background assumptions had important implications for the pluralist consensus 
theory: “It is within the embrace of these great lines of activity that the smaller 
struggles proceed, and the very word struggle has meaning only with reference 
to its limitations.”435 As Myron Hale concluded: “Bentley’s science of politics 
ended in a science of control within a closed system.”436  
Bentley’s early hints at a consensus narrative were only later adopted by 
postwar pluralists.437 But the idea of consensus had been in the air throughout 
American intellectual thought. In 1939 John Dewey concluded that American 
culture had produced “a basic consensus and community of beliefs.”438 
Fourteen years later, Daniel Boorstin echoed Dewey by heralding the national 
consensus of liberal values as part of the “Genius of American Politics.”439 The 
                                                                                                                 
 428. See Gunnell, Genealogy, supra note 360, at 260. 
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 432. Id. at 218. 
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 438. JOHN DEWEY, FREEDOM AND CULTURE 134 (G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1939). 
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consensus narrative was also buttressed by historians like Louis Hartz, whose 
1955 The Liberal Tradition in America argued that the moral unanimity of 
Americans stemmed from the only significant intellectual influence upon the 
American Founders—a “nationalist articulation of Locke.”440 While earlier 
historians like Charles Beard had focused on tensions arising from class 
distinctions,441 mid-twentieth century scholarship heralded “the consensus, 
rather than the conflict, between Americans.”442 By the late 1950s, the liberal 
endorsement of a welfare and labor system predicated on a fundamental belief 
in the integrity of the capitalist state prompted Daniel Bell to declare the “End 
of Ideology.”443  
Against this background, David Truman suggested that while organized 
groups were important, “potential” groups that reflected “those interests or 
expectations that are so widely held in the society and are so reflected in the 
behavior of almost all citizens that they are, so to speak, taken for granted” 
were also vital.444 These “widely held but largely unorganized interests” gave 
content to “the rules of the game.”445 And the rules of the game, when 
enforced by unorganized interests, constrained the practices of organized 
interests.446 In other words, a sufficiently homogenous background consensus 
of all citizens not only sustained the public order (which, for Truman, included 
“reinforcing widely accepted norms of ‘public morality’”), but also bounded 
the extent to which groups diverged from that shared consensus.447 Broad 
compliance was critical because “the existence of the state, of the polity, 
depends on widespread, frequent recognition and conformity to the claims of 
these unorganized interests and on activity condemning marked deviations 
                                                                                                                 
produced a kind of generlized, non-denominational faith” and “this kind of faith, taken together 
with the lack of distinctions in our political philosophy, has tended to break down the 
boundaries between religious and political thought.” Id. at 162. 
 440. LOUIS HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA: AN INTERPRETATION OF 
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 445. Id. at 506–07. 
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 447. Id. at 514. 
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from them.”448 The rules of the game gave politics a “‘sense of justice,’”449 and 
Truman posited that violating them would “normally . . . weaken a group’s 
cohesion, reduce its status in the community, and expose it to the claims of 
other groups.”450  
Truman also recognized that the balance wheel would encounter friction 
based on differences in group experiences, frames of reference, and 
“rationalizations.”451 He posited that a particular group’s principles or 
collective beliefs could cause its members to develop beliefs outside of the 
mainstream that they would not otherwise have held. Truman offered the 
example of military training: 
A group of professional military officers, recruited at an early age, trained 
outside of civilian institutions, and practising the profession of arms in 
comparative isolation from other segments of the society, easily may develop 
the characteristics of a caste. Such a group not only will generate its own 
peculiar interests but also may arrive at interpretations of the “rules of the 
game” that are at great variance with those held by most of the civilian 
population. In such a case multiple membership in other organized groups is 
slight and that in potential widespread groups is unlikely.452  
For Truman, this unattended divergence from the rules of the game 
threatened the health of democracy,453 and he saw it advancing within groups 
far less innocuous than the U.S. military. Communist organizations provided 
one example of worrisome groups falling outside of the consensus. The rising 
Civil Rights Movement in the South provided another example: 
The emergence in the disadvantaged classes of groups that reflect materially 
different interpretations of the widespread interests may encourage conflict 
and at the same time provide an inadequate basis for peaceful settlement. The 
appearance of groups representing Negroes, especially in the South, groups 
whose interpretations of the “rules of the game” are divergent from those of 
the previously organized and privileged segments of the community, are a 
case in point.454 
Truman believed that widespread divergence could be mitigated because 
the rules of the game could be “acquired by most individuals in their early 
experiences in the family, in the public schools (probably less effectively in 
the private and parochial schools), and in similar institutionalized groups that 
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are also expected to conform in some measure to the ‘democratic mold.’”455 
He did not expressly acknowledge it, but the imposition of a “democratic 
mold” collapsed pluralism into a position similar to the state-centered idealism 
that pluralism had originally challenged: lurking behind a seemingly benign 
agreement of values was the coercive power of the state. As Earl Latham 
observed in 1952, the state was the “custodian of the consensus” and “help[ed] 
to formulate and to promote normative goals, as well as to police the agreed 
rules.”456 Reflecting the degree to which pluralism had diverged from its initial 
anti-statist philosophy, Latham suggested, “[i]n the exercise of its normative 
functions,” the state “may even require the abolition of groups or a radical 
revision of their internal structure.”457 
Like Hartz, Bell, and Truman, Robert Dahl placed American politics 
within a broad consensus: 
Prior to politics, beneath it, enveloping it, restricting it, conditioning it, is the 
underlying consensus on policy that usually exists in the society among a 
predominant portion of the politically active members. Without such a 
consensus no democratic system would long survive the endless irritations 
and frustrations of elections and party competition. With such a consensus 
the disputes over policy alternatives are nearly always disputes over a set of 
alternatives that have already been winnowed down to those within the broad 
area of basic agreement.458  
For Dahl, this consensus was not a normative aspiration but an empirical 
fact.459 Under this theory, consensus assumptions set the boundaries of what 
could properly be considered “politics” and what could be considered valid 
scholarship on politics.460 In this way, the dominance of research paradigms 
buttressed normative claims, and consensus about methodology uncritically 
reinforced consensus about substance. 
Dahl argued that the pluralist consensus included “a belief in democracy 
as the best form of government, in the desirability of rights and procedures 
insuring a goodly measure of majority rule and minority freedom, and in a 
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wide but not necessarily comprehensive electorate.”461 In 1961, he asserted: 
“To reject the democratic creed is in effect to refuse to be an American. As a 
nation we have taken great pains to insure that few citizens will ever want to 
do anything so rash, so preposterous—in fact, so wholly un-American.”462  
Dahl also believed that the “ideological convergence reflecting a wide 
acceptance by Americans of their institutions [made] it extraordinarily difficult 
(and, up to now, impossible) to gain a big public following for a movement 
that openly seeks comprehensive, radical, or revolutionary changes in a large 
number of American institutions.”463 As a result, “radical movements” had 
been wholly ineffective in American politics:  
Throughout the history of the United States, political life has been almost 
completely blanketed by parties, movements, programs, proposals, opinions, 
ideas, and an ideology directed toward a large mass of convergent 
“moderate” voters. The history of radical movements, whether of right or 
left, and of antisystem parties, as they are sometimes called, is a record of 
unrelieved failure to win control over the government.464  
Dahl believed that as long as groups operated within the boundaries of 
consensus, the American political system provided “a high probability that any 
active and legitimate group will make itself heard effectively at some state in 
the process of decision.”465  
The consensus assumption of pluralism reflected in Dahl’s views laid the 
foundation for the freedom of association in two ways. First, it established an 
expectation that groups were valuable to democracy only to the extent that 
they reinforced and guaranteed democratic premises and, conversely, that 
groups antithetical to these premises were neither valuable to democracy nor 
worthy of its protections. Second, because this expectation excluded groups 
beyond the margins, the pluralist gloss on the groups that remained within its 
bounded consensus was unqualifiedly positive. For the pluralists, groups were 
not only fundamental to American politics, but they created harmony and 
balance through reasoned and appropriately constrained disagreement. But this 
idea, that groups were only valuable to democracy to the extent that they 
supported it, was bereft of either authority or tradition in American political 
thought. And because pluralists were attempting to define themselves in 
opposition to the oppressive tendencies they observed in European politics, 
they needed to appeal to the American context to substantiate their views. On 
the subject of groups and associations, Madison and Tocqueville were the 
obvious candidates to support their ideas.  
                                                                                                                 
 461. ROBERT DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN AMERICAN CITY 316 
(2nd ed. 2005) [hereinafter DAHL, WHO GOVERNS].  
 462. Id. at 317. 
 463. DAHL, PROMISE, supra note 410, at 52.  
 464. Id. at 50. 
 465. DAHL, PREFACE, supra note 414, at 150.  
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C. Pluralist Interpretations of Madison and Tocqueville 
James Madison argued in Federalist No. 10 that one of the most important 
advantages of “a well constructed Union” was its “tendency to break and 
control the violence of faction.”466 The “latent causes of faction” were “sown 
in the nature of man.”467 As Madison elaborated: 
A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning Government, 
and many other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to 
different leaders ambitiously contending for preeminence and power; or to 
persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to the 
human passions, have, in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them 
with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and 
oppress each other, than to cooperate for their common good.468  
Factions, by Madison’s definition, were adverse “to the permanent and 
aggregate interests of the community.”469 
Pluralists, looking back at Madison through the lens of the presumed 
consensus of mid-twentieth century America, read his negative connotations 
regarding factions out of the Federalist. Truman, for example, suggested that 
Madison’s factions “carry with them none of the overtones of corruption and 
selfishness associated with modern political groups.”470 Theodore Lowi 
observed that Truman’s reasoning turned Madison on his head: 
Note, for example, the contrast between the traditional and the modern 
definition of the group: Madison in Federalist 10 defined the group 
(“faction”) as “a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or 
minority of the whole who are united and actuated by some common impulse 
of passion, or of interest, adverse to the right of other citizens, or to the 
permanent and aggregate interests of the community” (emphasis added). 
Modern political science usage took that definition and cut the quotation just 
before the emphasized part. In such a manner, pluralist theory became the 
                                                                                                                 
 466. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 50 (James Madison) (Bantam Classic Ed. 1982).  
 467. Id. at 52.  
 468. Id. 
 469. Id. at 51; cf. Bernard Brown, Tocqueville and Publius, in RECONSIDERING 
TOCQUEVILLE’S DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 43, 48 (Abraham S. Eisenstadt ed., 1988) (Madison 
“postulates a critical difference between faction [even when it is embodied by a majority] on the 
one hand and justice or the public good on the other. Throughout The Federalist the warning is 
sounded that the immediate interests of individuals as well as of majorities may not further the 
long-term good of the collectivity.”). 
 470. TRUMAN, supra note 399, at 6; see also Paul F. Bourke, The Pluralist Reading of 
James Madison’s Tenth Federalist, 9 PERSP. IN AM. HIST. 271, 272 (1975) (“Madison’s 
discussion of faction and interest establishes the close fit of modern pluralist theory and the 
wider American political culture.”). 
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handmaiden of interest-group liberalism, and interest-group liberalism 
became the handmaiden of modern American positive national statehood.471 
Unlike Truman, Dahl recognized that Madison believed “that a faction 
will produce tyranny if unrestrained by external checks.”472 But Dahl misread 
Madison’s apprehension, believing it pertained solely to “majority factions.”473 
Dahl contended that “no political group has ever admitted to being hostile to” 
the “‘permanent and aggregate interests of the community.’”474 Rather, the 
“numerous, extended, and diverse” minority interests were part of “the 
restraints on the effectiveness of majorities imposed by the facts of a 
pluralistic society.”475 For Dahl, these varied interests operated within the 
defined boundaries set by a broad consensus and posed no inherent danger to 
democracy.476 Dahl thought that Madison had “underestimate[d] the 
importance of the inherent social checks and balances existing in every 
pluralistic society” that restrained factions.477 He also argued that Madison had 
not appreciated “the role of social indoctrination and habituation in creating 
attitudes, habits, and even personality types requisite to a given political 
system.”478  
Lance Banning has argued that the “pluralist misreading” of Federalist 
No. 10 attained its “widest influence” through Dahl.479 According to Banning, 
the “cruder forms” of this misreading suggested “that Madison delighted in the 
clash of special interests and identified the outcome of such clashes with the 
public good.”480 Quoting Daniel Walker Howe, Banning notes that “‘[f]action’ 
was not a value-free concept for Publius; a faction was by definition evil.”481 
Madison biographer Ralph Ketcham also dissents “from the view that sees 
Madison, especially in his tenth Federalist Paper, as validating modern 
conflict-of-interest politics.”482 By disregarding the dangers inherent in 
                                                                                                                 
 471. THEODORE LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED 
STATES 55 (2nd ed. 1979) (quoting Madison, supra note 466) [hereinafter LOWI, THE END]; see 
also id. at 36 (describing contemporary pluralism: “Groups became virtuous; they must be 
accommodated, not regulated.”).  
 472. Robert Dahl, Madisonian Democracy, in THE DEMOCRACY SOURCEBOOK 207, 212 
(Robert Dahl, Ian Shapiro, & José Anotonio Cheibub eds., 2003).  
 473. DAHL, PREFACE, supra note 414, at 26. 
 474. Id. (quoting Madison, supra note 466, at 51). 
 475. Id at 29. 
 476. Id. at 132–33. 
 477. Id. at 22.  
 478. Id. at 17–18.  
 479. LANCE BANNING, THE SACRED FIRE OF LIBERTY: JAMES MADISON AND THE FOUNDING 
OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC 205 (1995). 
 480. Id.; see also Brown, supra note 469, at 45–46 (arguing that twentieth-century political 
scientsts read The Federalist to reflect “the ideology of a wealthy and advantaged elite”). 
 481. BANNING, supra note 479 (quoting Daniel Walker Howe, The Political Psychology of 
The Federalist, WM. & MARY Q. 44 (1987)).  
 482. RALPH KETCHAM, JAMES MADISON, at ix (1st paperback ed. 1990). Ketcham makes 
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minority factions, pluralism transformed Madison’s “factions” into 
domesticated “groups” whose interests were broadly aligned with those of the 
modern liberal state.483 
Unlike Madison, Tocqueville drew no negative conclusions about 
voluntary associations.484 He instead “subverted” Madison’s analysis of 
factions and “regarded associations as a valuable way of connecting people by 
overcoming some effects of individualism.”485 Tocqueville’s optimism 
stemmed in part from his idealized view of associations in America: 
In America the citizens who form the minority associate, in order, in the first 
place, to show their numerical strength, and so to diminish the moral 
authority of the majority; and, in the second place, to stimulate competition, 
and to discover those arguments which are most fitted to act upon the 
majority; for they always entertain hopes of drawing over their opponents to 
their own side, and of afterward disposing of the supreme power in their 
name. Political associations in the United States are therefore peaceable in 
their intentions, and strictly legal in the means which they employ; and they 
assert with perfect truth that they only aim at success by lawful expedients.486  
                                                                                                                 
this assertion in the preface to the first paperback edition of his monumental biography of 
Madison, elaborating that “[p]recisely because Madison was so firmly grounded in classical and 
Augustan thought, he saw faction (and its eighteenth-century synomym, party) as a malignant 
opposite to ‘the permanent and aggregate interests of the community,’ a concept foreign to 
modern conflict-of-interest theory.” Id.  
 483. Cf. LOWI, THE END, supra note 471 (describing the difference between Madison’s 
conception of a “faction” and modern pluralists conception of a “group”).  
 484. See SHELDON WOLIN, TOCQUEVILLE BETWEEN TWO WORLDS: THE MAKING OF A 
POLITICAL AND THEORETICAL LIFE 240 (2001). Tocqueville had carefully studied both The 
Federalist and Story’s Commentaries on the Constitution, which reproduced Federalist No. 10 
in its entirety. Brown, supra note 469, at 43–46. Early in Book I of Democracy in America, he 
commented in a footnote that he would “often have occasion to quote ‘The Federalist’ in this 
work.” ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 134 n.g (Henry Reeve, trans. The 
Colonial Press 1900) (1835). He wrote, “‘The Federalist’ is an excellent book which ought to be 
familiar to the statemen of all countries, although it especially concerns America.” Id.  
 485. WOLIN, TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 484. Tocqueville thought that “men of virtue would 
filter the raw passions and demands of the people,” and “[t]hus would egoistic individualism 
(Madison’s factionalism) be transcended and an era of enlightened self-interest (Madison’s 
public good) ushered in.” Brown, supra note 469, at 53, 54; see also George Kateb, Some 
Remarks on Tocqueville’s View of Voluntary Associations, in VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS: 
NOMOS XI, at 138, 142 (J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman eds., 1969) (“The Madisonian 
vision of democratic politics as the struggle of potentially transgressive factions is absent from 
Tocqueville’s account.”). 
 486. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 484, at 196–97. Tocqueville’s conception of association 
also retained glimpses of the importance of face-to-face communication: association brought 
with it the “power of meeting” in which “men have the opportunity of seeing each other.” Id. at 
192.  
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In other words, Tocqueville assumed that associations would never seriously 
threaten the stability of government in America. He elaborated, tellingly, that 
“[i]n a country like the United States, in which the differences of opinion are 
mere differences of hue, the right of association may remain unrestrained 
without evil consequences.”487  
Dahl believed that Tocqueville was “struck by the degree of political, 
social, and economic equality among Americans”488 and “made this 
observation the very kernel of his famous analysis of American democracy.”489 
He agreed with Tocqueville that “Americans almost unanimously agree on a 
number of general propositions about democracy,”490 Writing in 1961, Dahl 
contended: 
Throughout the country then the political stratum has seen to it that new 
citizens, young and old, have been properly trained in “American” principles 
and beliefs. Everywhere, too, the pupils have been highly motivated to talk, 
look and believe as Americans should. The result was as astonishing an act of 
voluntary political and cultural assimilation and speedy elimination of 
regional, ethnic, and cultural dissimilarities as history can provide. The extent 
to which Americans agree today on key propositions about democracy is a 
measure of the almost unbelievable success of this deliberate attempt to 
create a seemingly uncoerced nation-wide consensus.491  
Importantly, Dahl recognized that Tocqueville had written in a preindustrial 
era, much different than the modern landscape:  
The America that Tocqueville saw . . . was the America of Andrew Jackson. 
It was an agrarian democracy, remarkably close to the ideal often articulated 
by Jefferson.  
 Commerce, finance, and industry erupted into this agrarian society in a 
gigantic explosion. By the time the [nineteenth] century approached its last 
decade, . . . the America of Tocqueville had already passed away.492  
But Dahl insisted that despite the growing economic inequality following the 
changes in the early twentieth century, a “universal creed of democracy and 
equality” persisted in mid-twentieth century America.493  
                                                                                                                 
 487. Id. at 197 (emphasis added).  
 488. DAHL, PROMISE, supra note 410, at 87. 
 489. Id. Dahl notes that African-Americans were an exception but maintains that there was 
otherwise immense equality among the “free white population.” Id. 
 490. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS, supra note 461, at 253. Dahl criticized Tocqueville’s argument 
“that the stability of the American democratic system depends . . . on an almost universal belief 
in the basic rules of the democratic game.” Id.  
 491. Id. at 318. 
 492. Id. at 2; cf. DAHL, PROMISE, supra note 410, at 89 (“The vast private corporations 
created by industrial capitalism had not yet arrived; the giant factories, the great financiers, the 
urban proletariat, the army of clerks and white-collar workers—these were still unknown.”). 
 493. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS, supra note 461, at 3.  
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This pluralist interpretation of Tocqueville’s account of associations 
overlooked two complications. The first was that Tocqueville’s case study of 
America in the 1830s had focused on an extraordinarily culturally 
homogenous population, thus giving him an overly sanguine view of harmony 
amidst difference.494 Rogers Smith has argued:  
 All these Tocquevillian accounts falter because they center on 
relationships among a minority of Americans—white men, largely of 
northern European ancestry—analyzed in terms of categories derived from 
the hierarchy of political and economic status such men held in Europe: 
monarchs and aristocrats, financial and commercial burghers, farmers, 
industrial and rural laborers, indigents. Because most European observers and 
most white American men regarded these categories as politically basic, it is 
understandable that from America’s inception they thought that the most 
striking fact about the new nation was the absence of one specific type of 
fixed, ascriptive hierarchy. There was no hereditary monarchy or nobility 
native to British America itself, and the Revolution rejected both the 
authority of the British king and aristocracy and the creation of any new 
American substitutes. Those genuinely momentous features of American 
political life made the United States appear remarkably egalitarian in 
comparison to Europe.495 
However, as Smith observes, the “relative egalitarianism that prevailed among 
white men” left unaddressed immense inequities pertaining to gender, race, 
culture, religion, and sexual orientation.496 When associations expanded to 
these interests—as they increasingly did by the mid-twentieth century—
differences of opinion were no longer merely differences of hue, and 
Tocqueville’s ideal theory lost its descriptive purchase. Pluralists to a large 
degree failed to recognize the limits of Tocqueville’s understanding of equality 
and, as a result, adopted an understanding of balance and consensus that 
excluded significant classes of people from its description of the political 
process. As pluralist critic Grant McConnell argued: “farm workers, Negroes, 
and the urban poor have not been included in the system of ‘pluralist’ 
representation so celebrated in recent years.”497 McConnell insisted that: 
“However much these groups may be regarded as ‘potential interest groups,’ 
the important fact is that political organization for their protection within the 
pluralist framework can scarcely be said to exist.”498  
                                                                                                                 
 494. ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. 
HISTORY 17 (1997). 
 495. Id.  
 496. Id. 
 497. MCCONNELL, supra note 389, at 349.  
 498. Id.; cf. id. at 358 (“Federalism and interest group ‘pluralism’ with which it is 
associated today are instruments of conservatism and particularism. The ideology of ‘grass roots 
democracy’ and the gradual growth of power in small units by the institutional processes of 
accommodation have probably betrayed us into yielding too much of the republic’s essential 
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Relying on Tocqueville to buttress pluralist accounts of mid-twentieth 
century America posed a second problem: the degree to which the relationship 
between public and private had shifted in the years since Democracy in 
America. Tocqueville had assumed a bifurcated political order consisting of a 
relatively limited government (which exercised law, authority, and coercion), 
and a larger sphere that consisted of nongovernmental social and economic 
relations.499 The theoretical foundation for this split came from a distinctive 
aspect of Lockean liberalism that “insist[ed] that government should be limited 
so as to free individuals to undertake private as well as public pursuits of 
happiness, even if this option erodes public spiritedness in practice.”500 In 
effect, the separation of public and private by Locke and other classical 
liberals created a sphere autonomous from government control.501 It also 
tacitly granted greater political legitimacy to the public realm, a realm that 
soon became synonymous with the state.  
This conceptual framework was not especially problematic at the framing 
of the First Amendment, when the state was relatively limited in scope and left 
a broad, non-public realm free from coercive regulation.502 Although the extent 
to which early American citizens viewed this non-public realm as “private” is 
difficult to pinpoint, it is clear that they believed it fell outside of the relatively 
limited public realm controlled by government. Yet groups that assembled 
outside of government sanction were nonetheless “public” in the sense of 
being visible to others and “political” in the sense of demonstrating and 
advocating an alternative way of life.503 The Democratic-Republican Societies 
gathered and feasted and paraded; suffragist groups formed conventions and 
marches; abolitionists rallied citizens to awareness and action.504  
The early American understanding of public and private for the most part 
endured at the time of Tocqueville’s visit to the United States.505 Tocqueville 
believed that citizens in Jacksonian democracy conceived of a narrow public 
realm confined to governmental functions: “In the American republics the 
activity of the central Government never as yet has been extended beyond a 
                                                                                                                 
values of liberty and equality.”).  
 499. See MARK WARREN, DEMOCRACY AND ASSOCIATION 32 (2001) (“[B]ecause 
[Tocqueville’s] bipolar state-civil society model fails to conceive economic and social power 
effects, it produces a limited conception of what counts as ‘political.’”). 
 500. ROGERS M. SMITH, LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 14 (1985) 
[hereinafter SMITH, LIBERALISM]. 
 501. See id. at 14–15 (“Liberalism’s most distinctive feature is thus its insistence that 
govenrment should be limited so as to free individuals to undertake private as well as public 
pusuits of happiness.”).  
 502. An important exception to the separation of public and private that I am describing 
was the role of state-sponsored churches in some areas of the country.  
 503. See Inazu, Forgotten, supra note 3, at 570 (“[G]roups invoking the right of assembly 
have inherently been those that dissent from the majority and consensus standards endorsed by 
government”).  
 504. See generally id. at 577–88. 
 505. See TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 484, at 275.  
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limited number of objects sufficiently prominent to call forth its attention.”506 
Because he viewed the nongovernmental sphere as more determinative in 
shaping the lives and values of citizens than the more narrowly defined 
“government,” he saw associations as necessary to maintaining democratic 
order through civic virtue.507  
The difficulty in applying Tocqueville’s framework to pluralist thought 
was that the reach of “government” or “public” in mid-twentieth century 
America was far greater than he had ever conceived. The growth of the market 
economy had initially reinforced Lockean understandings of public and 
private.508 But unprecedented advances in industrialization and bureaucracy 
that led to quasi-public corporations eventually rendered obsolete simplistic 
dualisms of public and private.509 Early twentieth-century legal thinkers began 
to question the assumption that “private law could be neutral and apolitical” 
amidst “a widespread perception that so-called private institutions were 
acquiring coercive power that had formerly been reserved to governments.”510 
Legal realists characterized “the distinction in classical liberalism between 
private and public law as arbitrary, demonstrating that all private transactions 
involved the state and that all law was, in an important sense, public law.”511  
Following these realist premises, New Deal reformers invaded the private 
realm with governmental programs, regulations, and bureaucrats.512 The New 
Dealers assumed that “the instruments of government provided the means for 
conscious inducement of social change” and that these instruments established 
“an indeterminable but expanding political sphere.”513 The Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                 
 506. Id. For example, the nation that Tocqueville observed in 1830 had fewer than 12,000 
federal employees (almost 9,000 of whom worked for the Post Office) out of a population of 
over thirteen million. DAHL, CONFLICT, supra note 413, at 60–61. 
 507. WARREN, supra note 499, at 30. Warren wrote, “Tocqueville linked capacities for 
mediation and representation to civic habits developed within the associational fabric of civil 
society, which he in turn related to a strong meaning of democracy located in associational 
capacities for collective action.” Id. 
 508. Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PENN. L. 
REV. 1423, 1424–27 (1981). Horwitz suggested that it was “[t]he emergence of the market as a 
central legitimating institution” that “brought the public/private distinction into the core of legal 
discourse during the nineteenth century.” Id. at 1424. Horwitz elaborated that “[o]ne of the 
central goals of nineteenth century legal thought was to create a clear separation between 
constitutional, criminal, and regulatory law—public law—and the law of private transactions—
torts, contracts, property, and commercial law.” Id.  
 509. See generally id. at 1424–28 (“The contemporary erosion of the public/private 
distinction . . . is but another symptom of the passing of that world of nineteenth-century 
decentralized competitve capitalism that once made that distinction a rough approximation of 
reality.”).  
 510. Id. at 1426, 1428.  
 511. KALMAN, supra note 442, at 17. 
 512. Id. 
 513. LOWI, THE END, supra note 471, at 42, 43; see also Theodore Lowi, The Public 
Philosophy: Interest-Group Liberalism, 61 AMER. POL. SCI. REV. 5, 6 (1967) (“Once the 
2010] THE STRANGE ORIGINS OF THE RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION 553 
 
mounted a spirited but short-lived resistance to this ideology in the mid-1930s, 
and a decade later the Court embraced the new liberalism.514 In 1948, the 
Court evidenced its acceptance of regulation of economic activity in Shelley v. 
Kraemer, which placed private contracts and covenants within the scope of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.515  
As the government expanded its reach into previously private domains, 
corporations, universities, and unions grew in number and size and 
increasingly assumed quasi-governmental functions.516 In Henry Kariel’s 
astute observation, “[o]rganizational giants such as General Motors, the 
Teamsters Union, the Farm Bureau, and the American Medical Association . . . 
emerged as full-fledged political regimes” and blurred “the formerly useful 
distinction between the public and the private.”517 Even as the pluralist critique 
of monist, state-centered theory redirected the study of politics toward the 
group, “the discovery that precious little in human life is immune to 
bureaucratization . . . dispelled some of the magic of the group.”518 The giant 
private bureaucracies were not akin to “that wonderful and wholly legitimate 
conglomeration of little groups which visitors from abroad [had] traditionally 
identified with Americanism.”519 They were rather “a newer set of large-scale 
organizational power blocs” that had come to “comprise most of the public 
order and occupy much of the public mind.”520 John Dewey suggested an 
“eclipse of the public” had created “many publics.”521  
Tocqueville had seen only one public, and its influence had been 
overshadowed by the private associations that he observed. By the middle of 
the twentieth century, this was no longer the case.522 The conception of 
“public” had moved in two directions. First, the increased role of government 
as welfare provider had expanded the governmental realm into previously 
private domains.523 Second, private organizations had grown closer to coercive 
                                                                                                                 
principle of positive government in a growing and indeterminable political sphere was 
established, criteria arising out of the very issue of whether such a principle should be 
established became extinguished. They were extinguished by the total victory of one side of the 
old dialogue over the other.”). 
 514. KALMAN, supra note 442, at 17–20.  
 515. 334 U.S. 1, 19–23 (1948). The Court concluded that state enforcement of property and 
contract laws qualifies as “state action” for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, thereby 
requiring states to outlaw any “private” act of racial discrimination that relied on these market 
laws for its enforceability. Id. 
 516. HENRY S. KARIEL, THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN PLURALISM 1–4 (1961).  
 517. Id. at 1, 10.  
 518. SHELDON WOLIN, POLITICS AND VISION: CONTINUITY AND INNOVATION IN WESTERN 
POLITICAL THOUGHT 374 (2nd ed. 2004) [hereinafter WOLIN, POLITICS]. 
 519. KARIEL, supra note 516, at 2.  
 520. Id.  
 521. JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS 126 (1927). 
 522. See KARIEL, supra note 516, at 1–4. 
 523. See generally SMITH, LIBERALISM, supra note 500, at 138–65 (discussing the 
development of economic welfare and the abandonment of “Lockean economic views 
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government in form and substance as they grew in scope and size.524 Lost in 
this mix was a subtle transformation of the understanding of the “political,” 
which pluralist thought confined to those interests and pressure groups directly 
engaged with governmental processes. That characterization was doubly 
problematic: it kept hidden groups exerting economic coercion in the private 
sector but at the same time depoliticized groups that were neither government 
nor economic. Truman and Dahl recognized the changing roles of public and 
private, but they largely embraced them as a favorable dissipation of public 
power.525  
Critics soon exposed the pluralist oversights. In 1966, Grant McConnell 
challenged the “comfortable assumption that interest groups will balance each 
other in their struggles and produce policies of moderation” in his book, 
Private Power and American Democracy.526 McConnell questioned the 
pluralist assumption that “private associations” were, in fact, private.527 He 
argued that the simplistic distinction between “public” and “private” had “been 
seriously blurred in recent years,”528 and suggested that this infusion of quasi-
public authority into private associations could not be ignored: “When, under 
the guise of serving an ideal of democracy as the self-government of small 
units, the coercive power of public authority is given to these groups, their 
internal government becomes a matter of serious concern.”529  
McConnell also challenged the pluralist balance assumption “that private 
associations are mutually countervailing;” an assumption which he viewed as a 
“a modern gloss on the argument of Madison and his colleagues in the 
                                                                                                                 
support[ing] . . . fixed limits on the government’s powers over property. . . . Indeed the course of 
modern commerce clause adjudication suggests that . . . no real boundaries remain on the 
activities and purposes that may be encompassed by the commerce power”).  
 524. See MCCONNELL, supra note 389, at 147 (“A more perplexing question arises when a 
private association called into being by actions of government officials acquires the power to 
exert great influence over policy and administration.”).  
 525. See generally TRUMAN, supra note 399, at 106–08 (explaining how “the increasing 
complexity of our society and the rapidity with which changes have occurred . . . have made the 
association the most characteristic and pervasive sort of political interest group”); DAHL, 
PREFACE, supra note 414, at 124–51 (Chapter 5, “An American Hybrid”).  
 526. MCCONNELL, supra note 389, at 362. 
 527. Id. at 146. 
 528. Id.; cf. id. at 362. McConnell writes, “[o]ften it is assumed that the role of the 
government is that of arbiter or mediator . . . . Neither role is possible where the distinction 
between public and private is lost.” Id. For example, the 1933 National Industrial Recovery Act 
and the 1935 Wagner Act bestowed upon labor unions “a substantial measure of public power.” 
Id. at 146. Professional and trade associations had been “given the power to nominate personnel, 
virtually as a form of representation, to official licensing boards” and “on occasion, to policy-
making boards.” Id. at 147. And “private” associations like the American Farm Bureau 
Federation and the Chamber of Commerce of the United States had “direct government 
encouragement in their formation.” Id. 
 529. Id. at 341–42. 
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Federalist Papers.”530 The pluralist account suggested that “by opposing each 
other, private associations supposedly check any overly greedy attempts by 
particular associations to extend their power” such that “in the large 
community, democracy is insured.”531 McConnell responded to this argument 
with the proposition that in practice, “private associations tend to be jealous of 
rivals.”532 These associations “seek to prevent the rise of competitors in the 
fields they have marked as their own” and “[o]ften, when such rivals do exist, 
there is bitter conflict between them, conflict that has as its object the 
destruction of one or the other.”533  
Other challenges to pluralist arguments came from Michael Rogin,534 
Theodore Lowi,535 and William Connolly.536 Rogin argued that the pluralist 
theory of group politics had reintroduced “social cohesion in a constitutional, 
industrial society.”537 He believed the underlying “[s]ocial consensus plays an 
overwhelming role in the pluralist vision”538 leading some pluralists to “define 
out of existence any conflict between groups and the public interest.”539 Lowi 
contended that Dahl’s conception “relie[d] on an extremely narrow definition 
of coercion, giving one to believe that coercion is not involved if physical 
force is absent.”540 He argued that Dahl’s conception “depend[ed] on an 
incredibly broad and idealized notion of what is peaceful about peaceful 
adjustment.”541 Lowi charged that ignoring these complexities meant that 
“interest group liberalism” helped create “the sense that power need not be 
power at all, control need not be control, and government need not be 
coercive.”542 Connolly similarly asserted that pluralists like Dahl had 
                                                                                                                 
 530. Id. at 123. 
 531. Id. 
 532. Id. at 124. 
 533. Id. 
 534. See MICHAEL PAUL ROGIN, THE INTELLECTUALS AND MCCARTHY: THE RADICAL 
SPECTER (1967).  
 535. See LOWI, THE END, supra note 471. 
 536. See William Connolly, The Challenge to Pluralist Theory, in THE BIAS OF PLURALISM 
3 (William Connolly ed., 1971) [hereinafter Connolly, Challenge].  
 537. ROGIN, supra note 534, at 10. For Rogin, pluralism was “not simply a defense of 
shared power or a sympathy for diverse values” but also a “theory of history in which 
industrialization is the major actor.” Id. Further, industrialization had destroyed “traditional 
stability,” but its success “enable[d] group politics to dominate a society.” Id. 
 538. Id. at 271.  
 539. Id. at 16. Rogin elaborated: “Since groups are ‘shared attitudes,’ all political actors 
can be called groups. Since versions of the public interest can only be rationalizations for group 
goals, the public interest cannot exist apart from group interests.” Id. But the consensus was 
markedly circular: pluralist theory recognized as legitimate only those group leaders “socialized 
into the dominant values and associations of industrial society.” Id. at 10. 
 540. LOWI, THE END, supra note 471, at 38. 
 541. Id.  
 542. Id. at 55. Lowi defined “interest group liberalism”:  
It is liberalism because it is optimistic about government, expects to use government in a 
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disregarded “notable discontinuities” between the conditions of postwar 
American society and the “basic preconditions to the successful operation of 
pluralist politics” that Tocqueville had stipulated.543 For example, Connolly 
suggested that “the emergence of the large-scale, hierarchical organization has 
significantly altered the character of the voluntary association” since the time 
of Tocqueville’s writing.544  
As the critics intimated, because pluralist theory of the 1950s assumed the 
status quo of an enlarged public sphere, its endorsement of group sovereignty 
was really epiphenomenal to a further legitimization of the public welfare 
function of the state and the increasingly bureaucratized corporations and 
universities that mimicked state functions and organization.545 This blending of 
public and private fundamentally altered the political arrangements about 
which Tocqueville and Madison had theorized. Dispersed power did not 
disappear or dissipate; it just became less visible.  
VI. THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY 
It is important to note that while Madison and Tocqueville held different 
views about the inherent characteristics of the group—Madison’s factions 
were essentially bad and Tocqueville’s associations were essentially good—
both theorists viewed groups as a check against majority rule. Madison wrote 
that majorities could be “unjust and interested”546 and sacrifice “both the 
public good and the rights of other citizens” to their “ruling passion or 
interest.”547 He thought that factions could ensure that a majority would be 
“unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression.”548  
Tocqueville warned similarly of the “tyranny of the majority.”549 He 
contended that the “omnipotence of the majority” posed “extreme perils to the 
American Republics.”550 Sheldon Wolin has suggested that by the second 
                                                                                                                 
positive and expansive role, is motivated by the highest sentiments, and possesses a strong 
faith that what is good for government is good for the society. It is interest-group liberalism 
because it sees as both necessary and good a policy agenda that is accessible to all 
organized interests and makes no independent judgment of their claims. It is interest-group 
liberalism because it defines the public interest as a result of the amalgamation of various 
claims. 
 Id. at 51. 
 543. Connolly, Challenge, supra note 536, at 4–5 (noting that Madison and Tocqueville 
provided the “intellectual springboard” for many pluralist thinkers). 
 544. Id. at 5.  
 545. Cf. WOLIN, POLITICS, supra note 518, at 374–75.  
 546. Madison, supra note 466, at 57.  
 547. Id. at 54; see also WOLIN, TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 484, at 248 (quoting Madison, 
supra note 466, at 57). 
 548. Madison, supra note 466, at 54. 
 549. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 484, at 195.  
 550. Id. Sheldon Wolin wrote that Tocqueville “concluded that in America there were 
insufficient legal safeguards against the tyranny of the majority.” WOLIN, supra note 484, at 
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volume of Democracy in America, Tocqueville shifted his concern from an 
explicitly legislative imposition of majority will to a more nuanced form of 
cultural hegemony.551 Wolin surmises that for Tocqueville, 
The danger was not that a legislative majority might ride roughshod over 
minority rights but a strange lack of opposition to the dominant set of 
values—and this despite an unprecedented degree of liberty and fully 
guaranteed rights of expression. He insisted that there was no country in 
which there was less intellectual independence and freedom of discussion 
than in America. His explanation was that in a democracy the majority 
combined physical, moral, and legal authority. Democracy’s vaunted 
inclusiveness did not extend to the critic who espoused unorthodox views; he 
would eventually feel the whole weight of the community against him.552  
Madison and Tocqueville both implicitly recognized that the capacity for 
groups to maintain autonomous practices, detached from and even antithetical 
to the will of the majority, was in some ways a destabilizing freedom. Mid-
twentieth century pluralism never acquiesced in this description, but it is 
exactly right: group autonomy poses risk rather than stability for the 
democratic experiment.  
The pluralist political thought that provided the background for the 
constitutional freedom of association largely failed to acknowledge that risk. 
The pluralist consensus assumption established boundaries within which 
measured disagreement could unfold but through which dissenting voices were 
marginalized or silenced.553 The pluralist balance assumption asserted a 
harmonious stability between those associations that remained within the 
consensus boundaries.554 Together, consensus and balance depoliticized 
political dissidents and disguised political power, yielding a skewed 
explanation for a stable democratic polity. Pluralists exalted associational 
autonomy because the associations accepted by the consensus neither 
threatened democratic stability nor diverged from democratic values. 
VII. A NEW ERA OF ASSOCIATION 
Initially, the consensus held. Civil rights groups advocating equality fell 
within the kinds of groups protected by the state.555 Communist groups (soon 
to be followed by segregationists) that stood outside of the consensus found 
                                                                                                                 
250.  
 551. WOLIN, supra note 484, at 250–51. 
 552. Id.  
 553. See supra Part V.B. 
 554. See supra Part V.A. 
 555. WALKER, supra note 13, at 240–42 (discussing protections given to the NAACP); see 
also POWE, supra note 37, at 490 (arguing that the Warren Court’s legal regime of racial 
equality was “directed exclusively at the South and was designed to force the South to conform 
to northern—that is, national—norms”). 
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themselves without recourse to the right of association.556 But tensions 
inherent within the democratic creed eventually rose to the surface. In 1984, 
when the liberal value of autonomy collided with the liberal value of equality 
in Roberts v. United States Jaycees,557 the democratic consensus became the 
consensus of Rawlsian liberalism.558  
At the same time, the right of association continued to be shaped by the 
jurisprudential arguments that had complicated its initial arrival. The divide 
between the liberty argument and the incorporation argument continued seven 
years after NAACP v. Alabama559 when the Court recognized the right of 
privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut.560 Justice Douglas initially connected 
privacy with association and located both in the First Amendment, but Justice 
Brennan counseled him toward a more expansive approach that tied privacy to 
the liberty of the Fourteenth Amendment.561 Fifteen years later, Kenneth Karst 
revisited Griswold’s connection between privacy and association in an 
influential article published in the Yale Law Journal.562 Karst contended that 
Griswold established a freedom of “intimate association,” which was “a close 
and familiar personal relationship with another that is in some significant way 
comparable to a marriage or family relationship.”563 The unstated corollary to 
Karst’s argument was that “non-intimate” associations would not benefit from 
the same constitutional protection. 
The implicit split between intimate and non-intimate associations in 
Karst’s analysis became explicit in Roberts, which denied the right of the 
Jaycees to exclude women from full membership in its organization.564 In his 
opinion, Justice Brennan asserted that previous decisions had identified two 
separate constitutional sources for the right of association.565 One line of 
decisions protected the right of intimate association as “a fundamental element 
of personal liberty.”566 Another set of decisions guarded expressive 
                                                                                                                 
 556. See WALKER, supra note 13, at 240.  
 557. 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
 558. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. 
Press 1973) (1971). My use of the term “consensus” in this paragraph is meant to describe the 
boundaries that the “democratic creed” places on the right of association as opposed to the more 
general “liberal consensus.” In this narrower sense, the consensus assumptions underlying the 
Court’s doctrine of the right of association held until Roberts. In the 1960s and 1970s, 
segregationists and communists were denied associational rights because they fell outside of that 
consensus. The broader liberal consensus, in contrast, was under attack by the late 1960s. See 
generally MCCONNELL, supra note 389.  
 559. 357 U.S. 449 (1959). 
 560. 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965). 
 561. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF THE WARREN COURT 237–38 
(1985).  
 562. Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980). 
 563. Id. at 629. 
 564. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 629–31 (1984). 
 565. Id. at 618. 
 566. Id. at 617–18. 
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association, which was “a right to associate for the purpose of engaging in 
those activities protected by the First Amendment—speech, assembly, petition 
for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion.”567 According to 
Justice Brennan, expressive association to pursue “a wide variety of political, 
social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends” was “implicit in 
the right to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment.”568  
Brennan’s categories of intimate and expressive association roughly 
tracked the liberty argument and the incorporation argument, respectively. But 
in a bizarre doctrinal twist (the kind that usually unfolds only when doctrine is 
not particularly relevant), the intimate association corresponding to the liberty 
argument began to command greater constitutional protections than the 
expressive association corresponding to the incorporation argument.569 This 
development in Roberts reflected a reversal of the debate in the Court 
illustrated by Sweezy v. New Hampshire570 and NAACP v. Alabama.571 The 
kind of First Amendment argument that Black and Douglas had relied upon for 
strong associational protections was rendered subservient to a more nebulous 
intimate association grounded in liberty arguments.572  
                                                                                                                 
 567. Id. at 618. 
 568. Id. at 622. 
 569. Id. at 623 (“The right to associate for expressive purposes is not, however, absolute. 
Infringements on that right may be justified by regulations adopted to serve compelling state 
interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means 
significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms. . . . We are persuaded that Minnesota’s 
compelling interest in eradicating discrimination against its female citizens justifies the impact 
that application of the statute to the Jaycees may have on the male members’ associational 
freedoms.”).  
 570. See generally Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1956). One example of this 
reasoning: “Our form of government is built on the premise that every citizen shall have the 
right to engage in political expression and association.” Id. at 250. 
 571. See generally NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). The Court 
held that, “the immunity from state scrutiny of membership lists which the Association claims 
on behalf of its members is here so related to the right of the members to pursue their lawful 
private interests privately and to associate freely with others in so doing as to come within the 
protection of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 466. Justice Harlan opined that, “It is beyond 
debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an 
inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which embraces the freedom of speech.” Id. at 460. 
 572. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618, 623. Brennan contended that intimate and expressive 
association represented, respectively, the “intrinsic and instrumental features of constitutionally 
protected association.” Id. at 618. These differences meant that the two forms of association 
warranted different levels of constitutional safeguards: “the nature and degree of constitutional 
protection afforded freedom of association may vary depending on the extent to which one or 
the other aspect of the constitutionally protected liberty is at stake in a given case.” Id.; cf. 
Kateb, The Value of Association, supra note 2, at 46 (“Running through Brennan’s opinion is 
the assumption that all nonintimate relationships are simply inferior to intimate ones.”); SOIFER, 
COMPANY, supra note 2, at 41 (contending that Brennan regarded expressive association “as 
instrumental and therefore subject to greater government intrusion”). See also John D. Inazu, 
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The Roberts framework led to similar results in Board of Directors of 
Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte573 and New York State Club 
Ass’n v. City of New York.574 And while some see the Court’s more recent 5–4 
decision in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale575 as a curtailment of Roberts, Dale 
largely adopted the analytical framework of Roberts.576 Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s majority opinion provided: 
[I]n the associational freedom cases such as Roberts, Duarte, and New York 
State Club Assn., after finding a compelling state interest, the Court went on 
to examine whether or not the application of the state law would impose any 
“serious burden” on the organization’s rights of expressive association. So in 
                                                                                                                 
The Unsettling ‘Well-Settled” Law of Freedom of Association, 43 Conn. L. Rev. -- (2010, 
forthcoming). 
 573. 481 U.S. 537 (1987) (upholding anti-discrimination laws applied to the Rotary Club).  
 574. 487 U.S. 1 (1988) (upholding anti-discrimination laws applied to a consortium of New 
York City social clubs). Two other cases merit mentioning. First, in City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 
490 U.S. 19 (1989), the Court denied the expressive association claim of the owner of a skating 
rink who challenged a Dallas ordinance restricting admission to “dance halls” to people between 
the ages of 14 and 18. Id. at 20. The case is interesting because it involved an associational 
challenge to the state’s efforts to enforce a discriminatory law rather then the more typical 
challenge to state efforts to enforce anti-discrimination laws seen in Duarte and New York State 
Club Ass’n. See id. at 20–23. City of Dallas is also distinguishable from cases like Roberts, 
Duarte, and New York State Club Ass’n because it involved a for-profit enterprise and no 
coherently definable membership. See id. at 24 (“The hundreds of teenagers who congregate 
each night at this particular dance hall are not members of any organized association; they are 
patrons of the same business establishment.”). The second case worth noting is the Court’s 1995 
decision in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 
(1995) in which a gay, lesbian, and bisexual group challenged its exclusion from a Boston 
parade under Massachusetts’s public accommodations law. Id. at 566. In rejecting the group’s 
claim, Justice Souter relied on free speech rather than free association principles. Id. at 568–70. 
Souter argued that “whatever the reason” the parade organizers had for excluding the group, 
their decision “boils down to the choice of a speaker not to propound a particular point of view, 
and that choice is presumed to lie beyond the government’s power to control.” Id. at 575. The 
free speech analysis seemed fairly straightforward, but it was difficult to reconcile with the 
Court’s approach to association in Roberts, Duarte and New York State Club Ass’n. 
 575. 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
 576. See Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutional Perils of Moderation: The Case of the Boy 
Scouts, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 119, 125 (2000) (“The Supreme Court’s decision in Dale did not 
overtly challenge the conceptual framework established in Roberts; indeed, it self-consciously 
purported to build on it.”); Seana Valentine Shiffrin, What is Really Wrong with Compelled 
Association?, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 839, 841 (2005) (“The Court’s framing of the issues [in Dale] 
grew straight out of Justice Brennan’s opinion in Roberts v. Jaycees.”). But see Samuel 
Issacharoff, Private Parties with Public Purposes: Political Parties, Associational Freedoms, 
and Partisan Competition, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 274, 297–298 (2001) (arguing that Dale 
eschewed “functional analysis following in the path of Roberts”). 
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these cases, the associational interest in freedom of expression has been set 
on one side of the scale, and the State’s interest on the other.577  
Far from signaling a robust associational freedom, Dale’s “serious burden” test 
revealed an arbitrariness as problematic as the balancing found elsewhere in 
the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence.578 Thus, Dale’s holding should 
not be mistaken as a deepening of the right of association. Rather, the Court’s 
reasoning reaffirmed the fundamental division between intimate and 
expressive association in Roberts, and there is little cause to believe that 
victory for the Boy Scouts reflects a deepening concern for associational 
freedom generally.579 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Roberts and Dale are full of problems, and most commentators have 
expressed befuddlement at one or both of these decisions.580 But what has not 
been fully recognized about the current vulnerability of the right of association 
is the degree to which the doctrinal shortcomings in Roberts and Dale can be 
linked to the original recognition of the right of association a half century ago. 
The three factors that shaped the right of association in NAACP v. Alabama 
and subsequent cases in the 1960s in many ways paved the way for the 
transformation that occurred in Roberts. First, the largely unquestioned 
pluralist consensus in the late 1950s and early 1960s opened the door for the 
Rawlsian consensus that emerged in the 1970s and placed certain associations 
beyond its contours. Second, the Court’s disparate treatment of communist and 
                                                                                                                 
 577. Dale, 530 U.S. at 658–59. 
 578. Id. at 658. John Hart Ely long ago cautioned that the First Amendment’s “balancing 
tests inevitably become intertwined with the ideological predispositions of those doing the 
balancing—or if not that, at least with the relative confidence or paranoia of the age in which 
they are doing it—and we must build barriers as secure as words are able to make them.” John 
Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First 
Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1501 (1975). 
 579. For indications that Dale might represent a pyrrhic victory for group autonomy under 
the current doctrinal framework of association, see Christian Legal Soc’y v. Kane, 319 F. App’x 
645, 645 (9th Cir. 2009) (upholding Hasting Law School’s denial of recognition of a Christian 
Legal Society Student Chapter for its refusal to accept openly gay members); Christian Legal 
Soc’y v. Eck, 625 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1041 (D. Mont. 2009) (applying Kane); Beta Upsilon Chi v. 
Machen, 559 F. Supp. 2d 1274 (N.D. Fla. 2008), vacated, Beta Upsilon Chi v. Machen, 586 
F.3d 908 (11th Cir. 2009) (district court upheld University of Florida’s denial of recognition to a 
Christian fraternity for its refusal to accept openly gay members, 11th Circuit held case was 
moot when the University recognized the fraternity). Kane, since restyled as Christian Legal 
Soc’y v. Martinez, is now before the Supreme Court. See Christian Legal Soc’y v. Kane, 319 F. 
App’x 645 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted sub nom., Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, No. 08-
1371, 1009 WL 1269076, at *1 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2009). 
 580. See, e.g., Kateb, The Value of Association, supra note 2; KOPPELMAN, supra note 5; 
Rosenblum, supra note 2; SOIFER, COMPANY supra note 2.  
562 TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77:485 
 
civil rights associations in the 1950s and 1960s carved a path for later cases 
like Roberts to deny associational protections to certain kinds of groups even 
in the absence of any imminent threat to security or stability. Finally, the early 
jurisprudential arguments over the constitutional source of association 
facilitated Justice Brennan’s later distinction between a right of expressive 
association (connected to the First Amendment) and a right of intimate 
association (tied to personal liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment).581  
These developments have weakened the constitutional protections for 
group autonomy. Much of the current vulnerability of the right of association 
stems from the Court’s reformulation of that right in Roberts. But Roberts 
cannot bear all of the blame. If today’s freedom of association is less protected 
than some might like it to be, the roots of its problems may lie in the political, 
jurisprudential, and theoretical factors present at its inception. 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 581. I have been careful not to attribute a direct doctrinal link between the Roberts 
categories of intimate and expressive association and the Court’s first articulation of a 
constitutional right of association in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
The Court’s arguments in Roberts in support of distinct categories of intimate and expressive 
association are for the most part novel claims unconnected to earlier case law. See Inazu, 
Unsettling, supra note 572 (critiquing the Roberts framework). For the reasons that I identify 
here, however, I do maintain that the political, doctrinal, and theoretical factors surrounding 
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson and the ways in which the Court responded to those 
factors in its early case law on association paved the way for the reformulation of the right of 
association in Roberts. 
